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CHAPTER 1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
The dynamic character of the financial services industry necessitates frequent appraisal of the 
regulation of the sector.
1
 The main objectives for regulation of the financial sector include 
financial stability, promotion of competition and protection of the consumers.
2
 In ensuring 
consumer protection, there is need to balance this with all the other objectives to ensure optimal 
protection in the entire financial sector.
3
 This can be difficult as it is mostly dependent on the 
regulatory framework in the financial sector for the basic reason that most of the failures are 
associated with regulation.
4
 Key to the challenges is that consumer protection is served by 
measures that ensure proper conduct on the part of the service providers.
5
 Interests of the 
providers of the financial services may thus not be sufficiently aligned with those of the 
consumers of the products.
6
 
There are three common models of financial regulation.
7
 They are the sectoral model,
8
 unified or 
integrated model
9
 and the Twin Peaks model.
10
 The financial sector in Kenya follows a sectoral 
                                                          
1Gakeri J ‘Financial Services Regulatory Modernization in East Africa: The Search for a New Paradigm for Kenya’ 
(2011) 1(16) International Journal for Humanities and Social Science 163. 
2
 Norton J ‘Global Financial Sector Reform: The Single Financial Regulator Model based on the UK FSA 
Experience- A Critical Re-evaluation’ (2005) 39 The International Lawyer 33 available at 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Licence (accessed 27 November 2016). 
3Cordray R ‘Foreword: Consumer Protection in the Financial Marketplace’ 2015 Havard Law and Policy Review 
307 available athttp://heinonline.org/HOL/Licence (accessed 27 November 2016). 
4
 Pan E ‘Four Challenges to Financial Regulatory Reform’ (2010) 55 Villanova Law Review 743 available at 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Licence (accessed 27 November 2016). 
5Lumpkin S ‘Consumer Protection and Financial Innovation: A few basic propositions’ (2010) 1 OECD Journal: 
Financial Market Trends 1 123. 
6
 Lumpkin S ‘Consumer Protection and Financial Innovation: A few basic propositions’ (2010) 1 OECD Journal: 
Financial Market Trends 1 123. 
7
 Huang H ‘Institutional Structure of Financial Regulation in China: Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis’ 
(2010) 10 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 241 available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/Licence (accessed 27 
November 2016). 
8Gakeri J ‘Financial Services Regulatory Modernization in East Africa: The Search for a New Paradigm for Kenya’ 
(2011) 1 (16) International Journal for Humanities and Social Science 163. 
9Lui A ‘Single or Twin? The UK financial regulation landscape after the financial crisis of 2007-2009’ (2012) 13 
Journal of Banking Regulation 23. 
10Lui A ‘Single or Twin? The UK financial regulation landscape after the financial crisis of 2007-2009’ (2012) 13 
Journal of Banking Regulation 23.  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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model. It is a hodgepodge of institutional and functional regulation.
11
 There are five (5) 
government agencies that regulate specific segments of the financial sector with each of the 
regulators being established to operate independently within the permits of an Act of Parliament. 
This is without mentioning the many other segments that have no specific regulators.
12
 
The Central Bank of Kenya (CBK), which is the main regulator, regulates and supervises all 
commercial banks and deposit taking micro-finance institutions.
13
 The Insurance Regulatory 
Authority (IRA) regulates insurance companies.
14
 The Capital Markets Authority (CMA) 
regulates the securities markets.
15
 The Retirements Benefits Authority (RBA) regulates the 
pension sector and Sacco Societies Regulatory Authority (SSRA) regulates the savings and credit 
cooperative societies.
16
As a consequence, there have been regulatory gaps, duplication, overlaps, 
inconsistent regulations and cost ineffectiveness.
17
 The consumers bear the brunt of all these 
shortcomings. 
The unveiling of the Kenya Vision 2030 in 2007, provided a new growth path in the country.
18
 
All plans for the country are drawn from this blueprint.
19
 Among its key pillars is the economic 
pillar which has the financial sector as a key component in realising progressive economic 
growth.
20
 It endeavours to have a vibrant and stable financial sector that promotes consumer 
protection. The Constitution subsequently also recognized consumer rights.
21
 Despite all these, 
                                                          
11Gakeri J ‘Financial Services Regulatory Modernization in East Africa: The Search for a New Paradigm for Kenya’ 
(2011) 1 (16) International Journal for Humanities and Social Science 165. 
12Gakeri J ‘Financial Services Regulatory Modernization in East Africa: The Search for a New Paradigm for Kenya’ 
(2011) 1 (16) International Journal for Humanities and Social Science 168. The financial segments that are not 
regulated include mobile money transfer, SACCOs that are not being regulated under SSRA and non-deposit taking 
financial institutions. 
13
 Okioga C ‘The upshot of financial sector regulation on the financial market performance in Kenya: Perspectives 
from Kisii County, Kenya’ (2013) 2 Business Management Dynamics 5. 
14
 Okioga C ‘The upshot of financial sector regulation on the financial market performance in Kenya: Perspectives 
from Kisii County, Kenya’ (2013) 2 Business Management Dynamics 6. 
15
 Okioga C ‘The upshot of financial sector regulation on the financial market performance in Kenya: Perspectives 
from Kisii County, Kenya’ (2013) 2 Business Management Dynamics 5. 
16Okioga C ‘The upshot of financial sector regulation on the financial market performance in Kenya: Perspectives 
from Kisii County, Kenya’ (2013) 2 Business Management Dynamics 7. 
17Gakeri J ‘Financial Services Regulatory Modernization in East Africa: The Search for a New Paradigm for Kenya’ 
(2011) 1 (16) International Journal for Humanities and Social Science 164. 
18
 The Kenya Vision 2030 (2007) available at http://www.vision2030.go.ke (accessed 26 November 2016). 
19
 Kenya Vision 2030 Flagship Projects Progress Report of November 2014 available at 
http://www.vision2030.go.ke (accessed 14 November 2017). 
20
 The Kenya Vision 2030 (2007) available at http://www.vision2030.go.ke (accessed 26 November 2016) 10.  
21
 The Constitution of Kenya 2010, Article 46. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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there have been no substantial improvements in the protection and advancement of consumer 
rights in the financial sector.  
With this regulatory framework, consumer protection has been difficult to achieve. The fact that 
financial services are inherently more complex than most goods or other more tangible services 
exacerbates the problem further.
22
 The inadequacies of the fragmented system have made it 
ineffective to guarantee consumer protection.
23
 As a result, there have been calls for a review of 
the regulatory framework in the Kenyan financial sector. At first, the Capital Markets Authority 
in its 1997-8 Annual Report argued for a consolidated regulatory regime.
24
 Following subsequent 
other failures in the system, the four main regulators, which are, Central Bank of Kenya, Capital 
Markets Authority, Retirements Benefits Authority and Insurance Regulatory Authority saw the 
need to have a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for purposes of information sharing and 
coordination.
25
 Even though it is a non-binding MoU, benefits have been drawn from it in trying 
to stabilize the sector and thereby protect the consumers.
26
 However, this is a short term measure 
and thus the need to review the overall regulatory framework to accord with the minimum 
international standards
27
 and thereby grow in tandem with market demands and remain dynamic 
and relevant.
28
 
This research is a review of the Kenyan financial sector with a specific focus on consumer 
protection. This necessitates an assessment of the sectoral system of financial regulation by 
looking at each of the aforementioned regulators in each of the segments and the unregulated 
                                                          
22
 Flaming M et al ‘Report on Consumer Protection Diagnostic Study: Kenya’ (2011) available at 
https://fsdkenya.org/publication/consumer-protection-diagnostic-study-kenya-2/ (accessed on 6 May 2018). 
23Huang H ‘Institutional Structure of Financial Regulation in China: Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis’ 
(2010) 10 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 243 available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/Licence (accessed 27 
November 2016). 
24Gakeri J ‘Financial Services Regulatory Modernization in East Africa: The Search for a New Paradigm for Kenya’ 
(2011) 1 (16) International Journal for Humanities and Social Science 16 163. 
25Gakeri J ‘Financial Services Regulatory Modernization in East Africa: The Search for a New Paradigm for Kenya’ 
(2011) 1(16) International Journal for Humanities and Social Science 165. 
26
Mwega F ‘Financial Regulation in Kenya: Balancing Inclusive Growth with Financial Stability’ Working Paper 
407 of November 2014. 
27
 ‘Implementing a Twin-Peaks Model of Financial Regulation in South Africa’ (2013) A Paper published for Public 
Comment by the Financial Regulatory Reform Steering Committee 1
st
 February 2013. 
28Mwega F ‘Financial Regulation in Kenya: Balancing inclusive Growth with Financial Stability’ Working Paper 
407 of November 2014. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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part of the financial sector. The performance of the various regulators will be assessed in terms 
of their ability to foster consumer protection.
29
  
It is important to note the fact that financial consumer protection is about ensuring a fair 
exchange between providers and consumers of financial services.
30
 This understanding is crucial 
for the reason that there is need to maintain a delicate balance of protecting the interests of the 
providers of these financial services, and hence promote competition and investors’ confidence, 
while at the same time ensure protection of the consumers of the services from the excesses and 
misconduct of financial institutions
31
 which take advantage of the regulatory gaps that make 
consumers susceptible.
32
 
Moreover, there is a large section of the financial sector in Kenya that is partly regulated or 
completely un-regulated. It includes non-deposit taking financial institutions, Savings and Credit 
Cooperative Societies (SACCOS) not regulated by Sacco Societies Regulatory Authority 
(SSRA) and mobile phone-based financial services.
33
 It is worth noting that Kenya is leading in 
mobile phone-based financial services in the world.
34
 This is without any formal regulation. This 
study will demonstrate that the current unregulated sector which has taken a large portion of the 
consumers of financial services exacerbates the vulnerability of consumers of financial services 
in Kenya. 
Many countries have been reactive in reviewing their financial sector regulation policies,
35
 
mostly in reaction to a financial crisis or a huge scandal.
36
 Undeniably, many countries have 
been facing challenges threatening the stability of the financial sector. The sector is normally 
dependent on consumer confidence and thus consumer protection is essential for its stability.
37
 
                                                          
29
 Taylor M ‘The Road From “Twin Peaks” – And the Way Back’ (2009-2010) 16 Connecticut Insurance Law 
Journal 61 available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/Licnce (accessed 27 November 2016). 
30Flaming M et al ‘Report on Consumer Protection Diagnostic Study: Kenya’ (2011). 
31
 Armour J & Awrey D et al, Principles of Financial Regulation (2016) at 3. 
32Lumpkin S ‘Consumer Protection and Financial Innovation: A few Basic Propositions’ (2010) 1 OECD Journal: 
Financial Market Trends 133. 
33Flaming M et al ‘Report on Consumer Protection Diagnostic Study: Kenya’ (2011). 
34Andiva B ‘Mobile Financial Services and Regulation in Kenya’ 1 15. 
35Lumpkin S ‘Consumer Protection and Financial Innovation: A few Basic Propositions’ (2010) 1 OECD Journal: 
Financial Market Trends 1 133. 
36Lui A ‘Single or Twin? The UK financial regulation landscape after the financial crisis of 2007-2009’ (2012) 13 
Journal of Banking Regulation 25. 
37Lumpkin S ‘Consumer Protection and Financial Innovation: A few Basic Propositions’ (2010) 1 OECD Journal: 
Financial Market Trend 128. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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Kenya is a typical example of this. Instead of waiting for a crisis to occur, this study will make 
an argument for a proactive approach to review the regulatory framework of the entire financial 
sector. In doing so, it will assess the strengths of a Twin Peaks model of financial regulation in 
consumer protection as an alternative to the current fragmented sectoral system of financial 
regulation, and indeed, to any other alternative approach to financial regulation.     
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
This research will highlight that the Kenyan sectoral system of financial regulation is ineffective 
in ensuring consumer protection. The inherent inadequacies of the regulatory system have 
weakened consumer protection in the financial sector. The regulators currently lean towards 
strengthening the stability of their specific sectors and thereby increase competition for economic 
growth and development, without necessarily considering the adverse effects on consumer 
protection. This is notwithstanding the fact that consumer confidence which is dependent on a 
strengthened consumer protection is necessary for economic stability. This is exacerbated by a 
weak segmented legal regime on consumer protection.
38
 
The handicap of the regulatory framework as shall be demonstrated in this study is that it is 
impossible to monitor the growth of the financial sector as a whole, resulting in the inability to 
address failures or crisis which have detrimental effects on the consumers. The problem is 
aggravated by lack of regulation of a large part of the financial sector and thus massive gaps that 
lead to adverse effects on the consumers of financial services.
39
 
1.3 Research Aims and Objectives  
The objective of this study is to determine the viability of the Kenyan sectoral system of 
financial regulation in enhancing consumer protection in regard to the financial market dynamics 
and the progressive growth of the sector.
40
 It will assess the strengths of the Twin Peaks model of 
financial regulation in consumer protection as an alternative to the current regulatory regime, as 
well as to other approaches to financial regulation. The study will address these objectives by 
conducting a case study of Australia, which was the first country to adopt the Twin Peaks 
                                                          
38Gakeri J ‘Financial Services Regulatory Modernization in East Africa: The Search for a new paradigm for Kenya’ 
(2011) 1(16) International Journal for Humanities and Social Science 163. 
39 Andiva B ‘Mobile Financial Services and Regulation in Kenya’ 1 10available at http://ryan-
hawthorne.squarespace.com/s/.../(accessed 26 November 2016). 
40Mwega F ‘Financial Regulation in Kenya: Balancing Inclusive Growth with Financial Stability’ Working Paper 
407 of November 2014. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
14 
 
approach to financial regulation. As a result, it will point out how Australia withstood the 
financial crisis of 2007-2009.
41
 Ultimately, the study will draw useful lessons from the 
Australian experience and make recommendations for the adoption of a Twin Peaks Model of 
financial regulation in Kenya as a measure of ensuring optimal balance between consumer 
protection and thus financial stability. 
The research objective is broken down into the following aims: 
1. To evaluate the various approaches to financial regulation in terms of their capacity to 
ensure consumer protection. 
2. To undertake a review of the current regulatory framework in the Kenyan financial 
sector. 
3. To point out the inadequacies of the sectoral system of financial regulation in Kenya in 
ensuring consumer protection. 
4. To conduct a comparative study on the legal regime for financial regulation in Australia. 
5. To make recommendations for a more appropriate model of financial regulation in 
Kenya with a view to enhance consumer protection in the country. 
1.4 Thesis Statement 
The central argument in this study is that the sectoral system of financial regulation in Kenya is 
too ineffective to guarantee consumer protection. The system is inherent with inadequacies that 
tend to have adverse effects on consumer protection. On the other hand, the Twin Peaks model of 
financial regulation is a better model that can be adopted in Kenya for the reason that it 
guarantees an optimal balance between consumer protection and financial stability.  
1.5 Significance of the Research 
The global financial crisis in 2008 led to the rethinking of the various approaches to financial 
regulation in terms of their ability to withstand such crises, and for the need to review domestic 
and global regulatory systems in the financial sector.
42
 Following the financial crisis, many 
countries prioritized economic stability and consumer protection by strengthening their financial 
                                                          
41Lui A ‘Single or Twin? The UK Financial Regulation Landscape after the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009’ (2012) 
13 Journal of Banking Regulation 23. 
42Pan E ‘Four Challenges to Financial Regulatory Reform’ (2010) 55 Villanova Law Review 745 available at 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Licence (accessed 27 November 2016). 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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regulation. This is to guarantee safer and efficient financial markets.
43
 As a result of this reactive 
approach by many countries, numerous challenges of implementation of the newly adopted 
regulatory systems in the financial sector may be experienced. Kenya was not adversely affected 
by the global crisis in 2008. This is mainly because of various reasons that include, among 
others, the structure of Kenya’s sectoral system. However, there are numerous challenges in the 
financial sector regulatory framework that have adverse effects on consumers and the stability of 
the economy.  
It is no wonder therefore that at present, there are on-going efforts at law reform in financial 
regulation. For example, since 2016, there have been two draft bills which if passed, would 
effect far-reaching changes to the financial regulation approach in Kenya.
44
 While the animus for 
the reforms is no doubt the need to eliminate the shortcomings in the current system that may be 
deemed to make the regulatory regime sub-optimal in achieving its objectives, there is the 
equally important fact that in 2010, Kenya adopted a Constitution that has certain consumer 
protection imperatives that will be discussed later. Arguably therefore, there is the need to ensure 
that any regulatory framework that is adopted mirrors the consumer protection standards 
stipulated in the Constitution.  This research is therefore useful not only for contributing to the 
on-going academic debates on issues of financial regulation but also for highlighting 
considerations that may be useful for those engaged in policy making in this area, especially in 
Kenya. 
1.6 Preliminary Literature Review 
As will be discussed below, many authors have since the global financial crisis of 2008 written 
on the suitability of the various financial regulatory models. The focus is on the strengths of each 
of the models to withstand global financial crisis. Before this, there has been literature on the 
uniqueness of each of the models depending on their implementation in various countries.  
Gakeri argues for the retention of the current fragmented regulatory system in Kenya over the 
short term, albeit with reforms.
45
 He suggests that specialization is nurtured in a sectoral system 
                                                          
43
 Pan E ‘Understanding Financial Regulation’ (2012) 1 Utah Law Review 1897 available at 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Licence (accessed 27 November 2016). 
44
 Draft Financial Services Authority Bill 2016; Draft Financial Markets Conduct Authority Bill 2018. 
45Gakeri J ‘Financial Services Regulatory Modernization in East Africa: The Search for a New Paradigm for Kenya’ 
(2011) 1 International Journal for Humanities and Social Science 16 165. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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of regulation and that Kenya is best suited to retain its current regulatory system. Despite 
identifying numerous inadequacies in the system, he argues that the Kenyan market conditions 
do not justify a shift to a unified regulator.
46
 However, he does not concentrate on consumer 
protection, either in the current sectoral system or in a unified regulator.   
Lumpkin has written on consumer protection and the need for financial innovation.
47
 He makes 
an argument that market confidence and consumers are undermined if the financial system is not 
adequately protected.
48
 He states that if regulation is correctly designed and properly enforced, it 
sustains consumer and investor confidence.
49
 In this case, he advocates for a proactive approach 
to policy in reviewing financial regulatory framework instead of a reactive approach that was 
evident in the post financial global crisis of 2008.
50
 
Mwenda discusses the legal aspects of financial services regulation and the concept of a unified 
regulator.
51
 He points out the need for independence of the regulator from political 
interference.
52
 In doing so, he draws lessons from the United Kingdom model and the Latvian 
model of financial regulation.
53
 There is however no focus on the ability of the unified regulator 
to withstand global financial crisis. 
Grady has written on the recent regulatory developments in the financial sector.
54
 He points out 
that there has been increase in complexity of financial products and services and thus the need to 
review the regulatory framework.
55
 He gives the reason of new technologies to deliver financial 
                                                          
46Gakeri J ‘Financial Services Regulatory Modernization in East Africa: The Search for a New Paradigm for Kenya’ 
(2011) 1(16) International Journal for Humanities and Social Science 163. 
47
 See generally Lumpkin S ‘Consumer Protection and Financial Innovation: A few Basic Propositions’ (2010) 1 
OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends 128. 
48
 Lumpkin S ‘Consumer Protection and Financial Innovation: A few Basic Propositions’ (2010) 1 OECD Journal: 
Financial Market Trends 127. 
49Lumpkin S ‘Consumer Protection and Financial Innovation: A few Basic Propositions’ (2010) 1 OECD Journal: 
Financial Market Trends 129. 
50
 Lumpkin S ‘Consumer Protection and Financial Innovation: A few Basic Propositions’ (2010) 1 OECD Journal: 
Financial Market Trends 128. 
51
 Mwenda K Legal Aspects of Financial Services Regulation and the Concept of a Unified Regulator (2006) 50. 
52
 Mwenda K Legal Aspects of Financial Services Regulation and the Concept of a Unified Regulator (2006) 35. 
53
Mwenda K Legal Aspects of Financial Services Regulation and the Concept of a Unified Regulator (2006) 40. 
54
 Grady R‘Consumer Protection in the Financial Sector: Recent Developments’ (2012) 1 JASSA: The Finsia 
Journal of Applied Finance 36. 
55
 Grady R‘Consumer Protection in the Financial Sector: Recent Developments’ (2012) 1 JASSA: The Finsia 
Journal of Applied Finance 35. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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services.
56
 As a result, he states that countries ought to take action at national and international 
level to raise standards in the financial sector. 
Mwega argues that after the global financial crisis, many countries are prioritizing stability by 
strengthening financial regulation.
57
 He states that the Central Bank of Kenya has adopted, 
though informally, a consolidated supervision approach, which requires information sharing and 
coordination amongst the various regulators in the financial sector.
58
 This, he notes, led to the 
Memorandum of Understanding signed by the four main regulators in the Kenyan financial 
sector.
59
 He also argues that out of the failures in the banking sector, Central Bank has shifted its 
focus to micro-prudential regulation for the purpose of assisting individual banks to come out of 
the liquidity among other problems they face.
60
 
Pan discusses the challenges that must be addressed in successful financial regulatory reform.
61
 
They include structure, separation of prudential supervision and consumer protection regulation, 
assigning responsibility for monitoring and managing systemic risks and the powers therein and 
finally management of cross border financial services regulation.
62
 He argues that there are 
various regulatory strategies that ought to be captured in a regulatory framework. They include 
rule-making, supervision, certification and enforcement.
63
 
From the foregoing, it is evident that there has been considerable literature regarding the various 
models of financial regulation. Their strengths and weaknesses vary from one country to another 
for what works for one may not work for the other. It is evident that there is no one-size-fits-all 
                                                          
56
 Grady R‘Consumer Protection in the Financial Sector: Recent Developments’ (2012) 1 JASSA: The Finsia 
Journal of Applied Finance 37. 
57
 Mwega F ‘Financial Regulation in Kenya: Balancing inclusive growth with financial stability’ Working Paper 407 
of  November 2014. 
58
 Mwega F ‘Financial Regulation in Kenya: Balancing inclusive growth with financial stability’ Working Paper 407 
of November 2014. 
59Mwega F ‘Financial Regulation in Kenya: Balancing inclusive growth with financial stability’ Working Paper 407 
of  November 2014. 
60
 Mwega F ‘Financial Regulation in Kenya: Balancing inclusive growth with financial stability’ Working Paper 407 
of November 2014. 
61
 Pan E ‘Four Challenges to Financial Regulatory Reform’ (2010) 55 Villanova Law Review 746 available at 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Licence (accessed 27 November 2016). 
62Pan E ‘Four Challenges to Financial Regulatory Reform’ (2010) 55 Villanova Law Review 746 available at 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Licence (accessed 27 November 2016). 
63
 Pan E ‘Four Challenges to Financial Regulatory Reform’ (2010) 55 Villanova Law Review 746 available at 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Licence (accessed 27 November 2016). 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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regulatory structure.
64
 However, as stated above, there hasn’t been any focus on consumer 
protection in the regulatory framework in the Kenyan financial sector. As a result, this study is 
distinct in the sense that it is a specific review of the regulation of the financial sector in Kenya 
in regard to consumer protection. 
1.7 Research Methodology 
This will entirely be a desk-top research, and will largely be based on library research and 
internet sources. This will involve assessments of the literature available on the topic. Such 
literature shall include published books, journal and newspaper articles, reports and legal 
instruments. The internet will be resourceful as a source of this literature. Therefore, both 
secondary and primary sources will be used. Primary sources will include the Constitution of 
Kenya, Acts of Parliament, regulations, reports and other policy documents. Secondary sources 
will include journal articles, internet sources and other scholarly material. 
The research uses Australia to draw lessons on the use of the Twin Peaks model of financial 
regulation. Australia is used for this study for the reason that it was the first country that adopted 
the Twin Peaks model and it is rated among the countries with best and most effectively 
regulated regimes in the world.
65
 Equally important still is the fact that as the first country to 
implement the Twin Peaks model of financial regulation, Australia offers the best study in terms 
of the longest experience in utilising this model of financial regulation.  
1.8 Overview of Chapters 
This paper has a total of five chapters. 
Chapter One 
Chapter one is the introduction to the research paper. It consists of the introduction of the 
research that gives its background, statement of the problem, research objectives and questions, 
significance of the problem, methodology adopted, a preliminary review of the literature used in 
the research and the overview of the chapters in the rest of the work. 
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Chapter Two 
Chapter two is a discussion of the various approaches to financial regulation and also of the 
current regulatory framework in Kenya. The chapter will use its discussions of the various 
possible approaches to financial regulation as a launchpad for evaluating the Kenyan financial 
regulation framework. In evaluating the Kenyan framework, the chapter will discuss in detail the 
various regulators within the specific segments in the financial sector, and their effectiveness. 
The fact that a significant portion of Kenya’s financial sector remains unregulated will be 
highlighted. It will also give a brief of the two reform Bills, which are, Financial Services 
Authority Bill, (FSA) 2016, and the Financial Markets Conduct Bill, 2018, currently before the 
National Assembly. As a result, a nexus will be drawn between this overall assessment of the 
regulatory infrastructure in Kenya on the one hand, and consumer protection on the other. 
Chapter Three 
Chapter three will discuss consumer protection in the Kenya’s financial sector. The specific 
legislation governing consumer protection will be discussed in detail. This is to evaluate the 
effectiveness of this legislation in protecting consumers in the sector. In doing so, this Chapter 
will identify the weaknesses of the current sectoral model of financial regulation in ensuring 
consumer protection.  
Chapter Four 
Chapter four is the assessment of the Twin Peaks model of financial regulation with a view of it 
being an alternative to the current regulatory framework in Kenya. The conceptual basis of the 
Twin Peaks approach and its defining features will be analysed in depth. The advantages and 
disadvantages will be considered, after which a case for the adoption of this approach in Kenya 
will be made. The experience of Australia as the country in which this model was first used will 
be reviewed, with a view to drawing lessons for Kenya.  
Chapter Five 
This Chapter concludes the research paper by drawing conclusions and making 
recommendations for the adoption of the Twin Peaks model of financial regulation in Kenya. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
2 APPROACHES TO FINANCIAL REGULATION AND THE KENYAN 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Introduction 
In recent years, many countries have made attempts to undertake an appraisal of their financial 
regulation approaches in a bid to ensure they are in tandem with the changing times. This has 
mainly been activated by the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008. As the debate rages on the 
possible causes of the GFC, many have pointed to the regulators and basically the overall 
regulatory infrastructure of their respective countries as one of the causes of the financial 
crunch.
66
 This is for the basic reason that the effects of the GFC seemed to vary from country to 
country, depending on their regulatory frameworks.
67
 As a result, reforms have been geared 
towards financial regulatory models that were seen to withstand the effects of the crisis.  
The main objectives of financial regulation include ensuring financial stability and soundness 
and protecting consumers and supervising market conduct.
68
 The ability of a regulatory approach 
to achieve these two objectives will determine its suitability. The criticisms that have been 
levelled against some approaches to financial regulation have been that such approaches do not 
strike a balance between the two sides to financial regulation. This Chapter makes an assessment 
of two approaches to financial regulation, the sectoral regulation and the unified regulator 
approaches. The Twin Peaks approach to financial regulation is considered in Chapter Four. In 
this Chapter, the definitive features, and the strengths and weaknesses of these approaches are 
highlighted. This sets the stage for a consideration of the regulatory approach that is used in 
Kenya’s financial services sector. The ineffectiveness of the current approach in ensuring 
consumer protection is evaluated. 
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2.2 Approaches to Financial Regulation 
Other than the Twin Peaks approach to financial regulation, the sectoral regulation and the 
single/unified regulator approach are the other models of financial regulation. The defining 
features of each of these two approaches are considered in the sections below. 
2.2.1 Sectoral Regulation 
This is sometimes referred to as the three-pillar approach to financial regulation.
69
 Under this 
approach, each sector in the financial system is regulated on the basis of the type of financial 
services that it provides.
70
 In other words, the legal nature of an entity will determine the body 
that will regulate it.
71
 Traditionally, the regulatory divisions have been in the form of separate 
regulators for banks, insurance companies and securities – hence the three-pillar approach.72 In 
terms of competence and jurisdiction, each regulator ‘develops its own approach, techniques and 
practices, preventing the other supervisors from intervening in its field of competence.’73 
One argument in favour of this approach to regulation is that it factors in the uniqueness that 
arises from the specialisations of the different institutions being regulated.
74
 The argument is that 
by ensuring that each sector is regulated depending on the type of activity it engages in, an 
acknowledgement is given to the differences that exist between these sectors and institutions.
75
 
However, the difficulty with this argument is that there is potential for inconsistent regulation for 
                                                          
69Wymeersch E ‘The Structure of Financial Supervision in Europe: About Single Financial Supervisors, Twin Peaks 
and Multiple Financial Supervisors’ (2007) European Business Organization Law Review 252.  
70
 Botha E &Makina D ‘Financial Regulation and Supervision: Theory and Practice in South Africa’ (2011) 
International Business & Economics Research Journal 27; Cunningham L &Zaring D, ‘Financial Regulation: A 
Cautionary Analysis Against Exuberance in Crisis Response’ (2009) 78(39) The George Washington Law Review 
82. 
71
 Botha E &Makina D ‘Financial Regulation and Supervision: Theory and Practice in South Africa’ (2011) 
International Business & Economics Research Journal 27; Cunningham L &Zaring D, ‘Financial Regulation: A 
Cautionary Analysis Against Exuberance in Crisis Response’ (2009) 78(39) The George Washington Law Review 
80. 
72
 See generally Botha E &Makina D ‘Financial Regulation and Supervision: Theory and Practice in South Africa’ 
(2011) International Business & Economics Research Journal 27; Cunningham L &Zaring D, ‘Financial 
Regulation: A Cautionary Analysis Against Exuberance in Crisis Response’ (2009) 78(39) The George Washington 
Law Review. 
73
 Wymeersch E ‘The Structure of Financial Supervision in Europe: About Single Financial Supervisors, Twin 
Peaks and Multiple Financial Supervisors’ (2007) European Business Organization Law Review 252. 
74
 Wymeersch E ‘The Structure of Financial Supervision in Europe: About Single Financial Supervisors, Twin 
Peaks and Multiple Financial Supervisors’ (2007) European Business Organization Law Review 252. 
75
 Wymeersch E ‘The Structure of Financial Supervision in Europe: About Single Financial Supervisors, Twin 
Peaks and Multiple Financial Supervisors’ (2007) European Business Organization Law Review 252. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
22 
 
firms that engage in activities that are largely the same.
76
 There is also the risk of other business 
activities developing that do not fall within the ambit of the existing regulators’ mandate.77 
It has also been argued against the sectoral approach to regulation, that due to market evolutions, 
the distinguishing lines that are used to differentiate between business entities for regulatory 
purposes often get blurred. This occurs, for example, when a firm ventures into other areas of 
financial activity for which it was not initially registered, for example, if a bank ventures into 
insurance and/or securities.
78
 In such a case, it is not just the classification of the firm that is 
blurred; the financial products it offers may also become difficult to classify under the traditional 
lines.
79
 
Romano has expressed the view that having multiple regulators is advantageous by itself, 
because it helps in ‘avoiding too strong a concentration of power and maintaining a sufficient 
degree of regulatory or supervisory competition.’80 In the same vein, it has been contended that 
having multiple regulators also increases supervisory competition.
81
 Whereas these arguments 
have been made as advantages of the sectoral approach to regulation, they are not 
uncontroversial. It has been questioned, whether, for example, supervisory competition is useful, 
since it leads away from convergence towards a more efficient common system.
82
  
Taylor argues that the sectoral approach to regulation have had the likelihood, and actual 
incidents, of conflicts of interest, confusion and damage are high in such a regulatory set up,
83
 
and that combining the prudential regulation and consumer protection objectives of regulation 
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under one regulator may lead to the ramification that one objective may be side-lined.
84
 These 
arguments concerning the sectoral approach to financial regulation will be discussed further in a 
review of the Kenyan system, at Section 2.3.1 below.  
2.2.2 Integrated/Unified Regulation 
This approach to financial regulation combines all regulatory functions into one regulator.
85
 This 
approach has been heralded for a number of reasons. First, a single financial regulator increases 
the scope for coordination and information sharing, at least in comparison to sectoral 
regulation.
86
 This is because all the regulated entities are under a single regulator. Sharing 
information with international agencies will also be easier, as regulators will have a single point 
of contact.
87
 Unified regulation also averts the potential for competition among different 
regulators for customers.
88
 The need for regulatory arbitrage, where firms try to minimize or 
avoid regulation by either placing their products in sectors that have the least regulation, or by 
designing new or redesigning existing products to minimise regulation is also averted. This is 
because a single regulator is better placed to iron out the inconsistencies and differences in 
regulation.
89
 
Another advantage of the unified approach to regulation has been given as its potential for 
flexibility. In this regard, it has been argued that a single regulator has more potential to respond 
to the rapidly changing physiology of the financial market.
90
 This is in contrast to the sectoral 
approach to regulation, in which the regulatory agencies are likely to be circumscribed by statute 
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if only to prevent them from venturing beyond their jurisdiction and competence, given that there 
would be other regulatory actors.
91
 For single regulators however, this fear is reduced, with the 
consequence that the enabling statute is more likely to allow room for flexibility for the regulator 
in light of the rapid pace of evolution in the financial sector, or could be amended more 
quickly.
92
  
A single regulator, it has also been argued, is likely to enhance regulatory efficiency by 
eliminating the possibility for overlapping regulation and harnessing synergies as far as 
regulation is concerned. Thus, for example, the collection and sharing of data relating to the 
various regulated agencies becomes easier, compared to what would have been the case if there 
were separate regulators for each sector.
93
  
In addition to the foregoing advantages, some pundits have contended that a single regulator 
enhances accountability, as every stakeholder knows where the buck stops.
94
 On the contrary, 
however, it may be argued that there still are accountability problems if the objectives of the 
regulator are ill-defined, and that this is not necessarily an advantage that can be monopolised by 
single regulators: as long as the objectives of regulation are clearly defined, accountability is 
achievable even with sectoral regulation.
95
 
The disadvantages of having a single regulator, in addition to those outlined above, include the 
fact that because of having to supervise a range of different institutions, the regulator may have 
poorly defined objectives.
96
 At the same time, regulatory efficiency may not necessarily be 
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achievable, given that the regulator will need to still have different sets of regulation for the 
various sectors under regulation.
97
  
Equally problematic is the fact that a single regulator is susceptible to entrenching certain 
regulatory objectives at the expense of others.
98
 It has been argued, for example, that since 
consumer protection has more visible political consequences, regulators may be biased towards it 
at the expense of prudential regulation.
99
 This is significant as a disadvantage given that, in the 
long run, consumer protection is a common thread that runs through even prudential regulation, 
as a failure of prudential regulation may also ultimately undermine the interests of the 
consumers, when, for example, a firm collapses.
100
 A classic example of these challenges was 
displayed when the Financial Services Authority (FSA) which was the single regulator in the 
United Kingdom during the financial crisis and was forced to breakdown into the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA) and Prudential Conduct Authority (PRA) after the financial crisis. 
This will be further be espoused when discussing Twin Peaks.   
In sum, therefore, the unified approach to financial regulation does not guarantee optimal 
consumer protection, particularly because of the likelihood that a single unified regulator may 
prioritize certain objectives over others. 
2.3 Financial Regulation in Kenya 
Kenya has a sectoral model of financial regulation in the regulated part of the sector. It has five 
(5) regulators with each focusing on each of the sectors which include, banking, insurance, 
saccos, capital markets or securities and pensions. This has led to, among other things, regulatory 
gaps, duplication, overlaps, inconsistent regulations and cost ineffectiveness.
101
 As a result, 
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consumers of the financial services bear the brunt of all these deficiencies. This has been 
exacerbated by the unforeseen effects inherent in the unregulated part of the financial sector.
102
 
Though Kenya was not affected by the GFC, it has not been left behind in its quest to reform its 
financial sector. There have been discussions to adopt a model with a leaner number of 
regulators with much more preference to a single or unitary model.
103
 This has resulted to a draft 
Financial Services Authority Bill, 2016,
104
 and the draft Financial Services Market Conduct 
Authority, 2018,
105
 both of which are yet to be tabled in Parliament. The FSA Bill, 2016, unlike 
other government Bills, has not been backed by Policy and attempts to consolidate four 
regulators into one regulator. This is mainly to cut costs of the current regulatory framework. In 
doing so, the main underlying problems and challenges inherent in the current regulatory model 
remain unaddressed; especially as far as consumer protection is concerned. It thus leaves a huge 
for perpetuation of the ills in the current regulatory structure. 
2.3.1 The Kenyan Financial Sector 
Kenya has one of the most developed financial sectors in Africa.
106
 Despite having its fair share 
of the challenges, it has struggled to have stability over the years. It is divided into two distinct 
parts. The first part is the regulated part of the financial sector while the other is the partly 
regulated or completely unregulated. This has five (5) regulators established through statutes 
with clear mandates and jurisdictional scope.  
2.3.1.1 The Regulated Financial Sector 
The regulated part of the Kenyan financial sector has five (5) key regulators. They include; 
Central Bank of Kenya regulating the banking sector, Insurance Regulatory Authority being the 
regulator for the insurance sector, Retirements Benefits Authority for the pensions sector, Capital 
Markets Authority for the Capital Markets and Sacco Societies Regulatory Authority for 
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SACCOs.
107
 These regulators are independent of each other and they conduct their affairs in 
each of the sectors without necessarily considering the activities in other segments of the 
financial sector.
108
 With this in mind, each of the sectors will be discussed below. 
2.3.1.1.1 The Banking Sector 
The banking segment of the financial sector plays a very crucial role not only in the financial 
sector development but also in the economic development of the country. This is mainly by 
ensuring efficient allocation of financial resources in the Kenyan economy.
109
 The sector has its 
regulator as the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK).  
The Central Bank of Kenya was first established through the Central Bank of Kenya Act.
110
 It 
was further entrenched in the Constitution of Kenya, 2010.
111
  The Act
112
 goes further to provide 
for its operation and the currency of Kenya. It is also the lender of last resort. Kenya being a 
bank-based financial system, CBK is the main regulator. It regulates all the banks and deposit-
taking micro-finance institutions. Apart from the Central Bank of Kenya Act, the banking sector 
is governed by the Banking Act
113
 as amended and CBK guidelines and regulations made 
pursuant to the Central Bank of Kenya Act and the Banking Act. The deposit-taking 
microfinance institutions are governed by the Micro-Finance Act.
114
 
The Banking Act is the substantive law that regulates the business of banking in Kenya. It 
provides for, inter alia, the licensing requirements, reserves and dividends provisions, accounts 
and audit, information and reporting requirements and inspection and control of banks. It also 
establishes the Deposit Protection Fund Board (DPFB).
115
 With the established framework in the 
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Act, CBK is given capacity to regulate the banking sector.
116
 This is enhanced through the power 
given by the Act to enable it make regulations for better application of the Act.  
There has been substantial growth of the banking sector from independence to date. This is in 
line with the various transformative stages that the sector underwent.
117
 At independence, the 
banking like many other sectors of the Kenyan economy was dominated by foreign-owned 
banks. They include, inter alia, Barclays Bank and Standard Chartered Bank that continue to 
operate today. As a result of the East African countries gaining independence, there was need for 
the respective countries which are Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya to have control over their 
monetary and financial policies.
118
 
The Central Bank of Kenya was established in 1966 through an Act of Parliament.
119
 This was 
after the dissolution of the East African Currency Board (EACB) that was the governing body 
for the finances and currency of the three British colonies.
120
 There was steady economic growth 
thereafter with an estimated annual growth of 7.1% to the early 1970s.  
In 1968, the government established two new banks, the Cooperative Bank of Kenya and the 
National Bank of Kenya. It also established specialized Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) 
to bridge the gap that occasioned the need for local ownership in the banking sector. The DFIs 
established included the Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation (ICDC), the 
Industrial Development Bank (IDB), the Development Finance Corporation of Kenya (DFCK) 
and the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC).
121
 The aim was to increase access of loans to 
Kenyans and also purchase of shares in the public corporations.
122
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In the 1980s, the push to have more locally owned institutions intensified leading to an upsurge 
in the growth of non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs).
123
 It was mainly being facilitated by 
political and regulatory factors. The main regulatory factor was the extremely low minimum 
capital requirements. This led to some banks taking advantage of this regulatory gap and thus 
setting up NBFIs.
124
 On the political factors, the Minister of Finance then had authority to grant 
exemptions to the provisions of the Banking Act.
125
 Politics also remained a key factor because 
many banks and NBFIs were owned by politicians or had politicians as Board members, and 
could thus influence decisions at the national level.
126
 On the other hand, CBK had very little 
capacity to exercise supervisory roles over the growth of NBFIs.
127
 
As a consequence, the seeds of weakness in the banking sector were well entrenched with the 
growth of the NBFIs. This led to the failure of 12 banks between 1984 and1989.
128
 In 1989, the 
Deposit Protection Fund Board (DPFB) was established.
129
 This is to provide compensation to 
small depositors in cases of bank failure. It also took the responsibility for liquidating failed 
banks.
130
 This was a reactive measure to the failure occasioned by the rapid rise of financial 
institutions, poor regulation, shifting political economic trends and also declining economic 
growth.
131
 
In the 1990s, there was financial liberalization in the banking sector.
132
 This was influenced by 
McKinnon Shaw hypothesis that government control of interest rates was seen as a key 
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constraint to financial sector development.
133
 As a result, commercial banks were allowed to deal 
with foreign exchange in 1992. This coincided with the political transformation in the country as 
a result of the first multi-party elections. In 1993, a market-determined flexible exchange rate 
system was adopted for the Kenya Shilling.
134
 In 1997, in a view to reduce political interference, 
the responsibility to appoint the CBK Governor and its management was transferred to a Board 
of Directors appointed by the President.
135
 This, arguably, minimized any influence that the 
responsible Minister would have over the Governor, as the Minister was no longer the 
Governor’s appointing authority.   
From 1999 onwards, the banking sector has experienced numerous regulatory changes aimed at 
improving the regulation and supervision of banks. This has registered significant success in 
terms of the stability of the sector. Pursuant to the Basel I, II & III standards on capital adequacy, 
CBK has enforced these requirements on Kenyan banks with minimum capital requirements 
increasing from Kenya Shillings 250 Million in 2000 to Kenya Shillings 1 Billion in 2012. The 
deadline for a minimum core capital of Kenya Shillings 5 Billion is December, 2018. This has 
strengthened the capacity of banks in the country.
136
 The establishment of the Credit Reference 
Bureaus in 2008 has also led to a reduction of non-performing loans in the sector.
137
 
As a measure of increasing access to banking services, CBK published agent banking guidelines 
in 2011.
138
 This entails use of agents by banks to reach customers. It has strengthened access to 
financial services with many local banks taking advantage to increase their service delivery 
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through the agents.
139
 As a result of these transformative measures, significant progress in terms 
of increased financial depth, reduced concentration, increased stability and increased access has 
been achieved.
140
 
In trying to reduce the high interest rates, the Kenyan Parliament passed a law in 2016
141
 to cap 
interest rates ceiling to no more than four per cent the base rate set and published by CBK. This 
was received with relief by Kenyans. The Kenya Bankers Association (KBA) fought a strong 
battle to prevent the passing of this law, all in vain. As a result, the burden occasioned by the 
very high interest rates has been reduced after the implementation of the Act. 
However, the banking sector has had systemic challenges that range from indifference in the 
application of regulations by CBK, segmentation of the financial sector by activities, high 
interest rate spreads, high overhead costs, failure to comply with regulatory requirements and 
also financial access and inclusion.
142
 This led to the collapse of 12 banks between 1984 and 
1989, 19 banks between 1993 and 1995, 6 banks in 1998, 6 banks between 2007 and 2015 and 1 
bank in 2016.
143
 Without doubt, this has had adverse effects on consumers of the financial 
services as the DPFB has limits as to the amount to compensate upon collapse of the banks. 
There have been different CBK regulations for the commercial banks and the NBFIs.
144
 This 
creates a situation where the growth in the sector is not sustained due to these regulatory 
differences. Many banks still have hidden charges in their transactions. This is exacerbated by 
the diversity of financial services in the advent of technological innovation and the institutional 
diversity in the sector. As a result of the foregoing, CBK, as the regulator, finds it difficult to 
adequately protect consumers of the financial services provided by the banking institutions.
145
 
2.3.1.1.2 The Insurance Sector 
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The insurance segment of the financial sector has registered tremendous growth from the pre-
independence period to date.
146
 It has its current regulator as the Insurance Regulatory Authority 
(IRA) established under the Insurance Act
147
 governing it. Despite numerous challenges, it has 
sustained a dynamic industry that has relatively small companies in terms of global standards but 
resilient at the same time.
148
 As a result, it has grown from a foreign-owned industry offering 
limited insurance and reinsurance services to an insurance industry that has diversified its 
ownership, players and services being provided.
149
  
Before independence, the insurance sector had no legislation governing it. Instead, it was being 
governed by the Companies Act.
150
 This created a gap in the development of the sector and thus 
the need to provide for legislation after independence. The Insurance Ordinance of 1960 was 
promulgated with its main functions being the establishment, financing and operation of the 
insurance companies. The implementation of the Ordinance however didn’t bear results as it was 
a duplication of the Insurance British Ordinance.
151
 As a result, there were chaos and confusion 
in the regulatory framework of the sector. This created fertile breeding grounds for the problems 
that continue to bedevil the insurance industry.
152
   
In 1986, the first Insurance Act
153
 was enacted and came into force in January 1987. The Act 
provided for a regulator, registration of insurance and reinsurance companies and other players 
that included agents and brokers in the industry. This gave a new re-birth to the growth of the 
sector. The challenges were however enormous as a result of problems entrenched in the sector. 
This led to many insurance companies collapsing in the 1990s, such as the Kenya National 
Assurance Company, United Insurance, Standard Assurance, Access Insurance, Stallion 
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Insurance, among others.
154
 The government reacted to this by establishing the Policy Holders 
Compensation Fund in 2004.
155
 This was to compensate policy holders after the collapse of 
insurance companies.
156
 The compensation was however limited to a maximum of 1,000 US 
Dollars, which was too little to celebrate.
157
 However, it gave new hope to policy holders. 
Various amendments were also introduced in 2003 to provide for stricter penalties in case of 
violation of the Act. 
In 2006, important amendments aimed at bolstering the regulation of the insurance sector were 
introduced.
158
 As a result, the Insurance Regulatory Authority (IRA) was established to replace 
the Office of the Commissioner for Insurance in the Ministry of Finance. This became the 
regulator of the insurance sector and started its operations in May, 2007. It had greater autonomy 
to fully regulate the sector. Its key functions are to ensure effective regulation, supervision and 
development of insurance in Kenya. In a bid to strengthen the supervisory and regulatory powers 
of the regulator, various amendments to the Act were introduced in 2010
159
 and 2011.
160
 More 
amendments were also introduced in 2013
161
 and 2014
162
 to give the regulator power to conduct 
inquiries and investigation on licenses, to provide new capital requirements for reinsurers and 
facilitate the implementation of the East African Community (EAC) Common Market Protocol 
that promoted business in the sector to all EAC members among its member states. 
IRA has undertaken various measures to stabilize the insurance industry. Key among them are 
promotion of consumer protection, establishment of Policyholders Compensation Fund, 
promotion of consumer education, establishment of Insurance Fraud Investigation Unit in 2011 
and training of various interest groups about the insurance sector.
163
 In enhancing consumer 
protection and education, it established departments to focus on these.
164
 The Fraud Investigation 
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unit undertakes investigation of insurance fraud. This will mitigate the risk of fraud within the 
insurance sector and thus bolster public confidence.
165
 
In a bid to enhance industry capacity and stability, the regulator is in the process of 
implementing Risk Based Supervision framework.
166
 The government supported this initiative 
by introducing Risk Based Capital in 2015.
167
 Further to this, the regulator in line with the 
Constitution is also in the process of devolving its services to the Counties. This is in a view to 
increase the penetration rate in the country.
168
 These measures, arguably, will align Kenya’s 
regulatory framework with the international best practices and thereby enhance confidence in the 
industry. 
The Kenya Vision 2030 identified the economic pillar as key to its achievement. The insurance 
sector is one of the main contributors to economic growth.
169
 As a result, the regulator was re-
energized to facilitate the growth of the insurance sector and thus propel the achievement of 
Vision 2030.
170
 This has led to tremendous growth of the insurance sector making it the biggest 
in East Africa.
171
  
However, despite the growth registered, numerous challenges continue to bedevil the insurance 
sector in Kenya. They include, inter alia, claims settlement and volume, delays in premium 
collection, non-compliance with the cash and carry premium system, inappropriate staff skills in 
some areas, fraud and the quality of intermediary services, predatory premium rate undercutting 
and customer retention.
172
 These challenges have been exacerbated with the growth of cartels, a 
temperamental judicial system and inadequate use of technology and poor mobilization of 
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investment capital.
173
 As a result, these challenges have hampered success and operation in the 
Kenyan market leading to the slow growth of the sector.
174
    
2.3.1.1.3 The Pensions Sector 
The pension segment of the financial sector in Kenya has been relatively stable and has 
witnessed tremendous growth over the years.
175
 This growth accrues mainly from the economic 
growth of the country and not as a result of a vibrant pensions sector.
176
 It has its regulator as the 
Retirements Benefits Authority (RBA) established under the Retirements Benefits Act of 1997. 
The regulator’s key functions among others are to regulate, supervise and promote the retirement 
benefits sector.
177
 
The government under its Medium-Term Plan of 2013-17 underscored the importance of saving 
for retirement and use of such resources for national economic development.
178
 As a result, the 
sector is expected to play a very critical role in mobilizing savings by raising institutional capital 
through pension fund reforms.
179
 This entails, inter alia, increased coverage of the pension 
scheme, increased awareness of the benefits of saving for retirement, improved supervision and 
regulation. RBA thus has to undertake measures that will enable the government to achieve these 
goals and propel the achievement of Vision 2030. 
The existing pensions sector is disjointed. Different segments of the sector have different legal 
frameworks.
180
 The Civil Service Pensions Scheme under the Pensions Act
181
 covers the civil 
service which is being funded from taxes. The National Social Security Fund under the National 
Social Security Fund Act
182
 covers the formal sector workers in organizations with more than 
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five employees. The Occupational Scheme,
183
 which is under trust deed governs formal sector 
workers in organizations with their owned schemes. The Individual schemes are also under trust 
deed. The Retirement Benefits Act
184
 governs the Occupational and Individual schemes. This 
attests to the bias of the pension schemes towards those in formal employment.
185
   
As a result of the disjointed system, the sector is characterized by poor overall levels of coverage 
and benefit adequacy, small size of formal economy relative to informal economy, low levels of 
disposable income, insufficient insurance against longevity and competing priorities.
186
 The level 
of coverage stands at 15% of the working population.
187
 This is mainly for the reason that the 
existing pension schemes are limited to formal sector workers. The other reasons causing low 
coverage include a faster growing informal sector than formal sector. Individual retirement 
benefits scheme is still in infancy stage and high poverty levels making retirement savings not a 
priority.
188
 To improve coverage, the government is in the process of converting existing 
provident fund for private sector workers into a national social insurance pension scheme.
189
 This 
measure is however the short term and thus creating the need for the sector’s players to move 
swiftly to initiate reforms to stabilize the sector. 
The regulator has introduced various initiatives geared towards increased coverage to the low-
income population. At the end of 2011, it launched an innovative programme known as Mbao 
Pension Plan along with the National Federation of Jua Kali Associations as a way of extending 
savings plan coverage to workers in the informal sector.
190
 This was through the private sector 
providers of cell phone technology that are spearheading mobile money transfer.
191
 The 
programme is a voluntary savings plan where individual workers choose the amount of their 
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contributions. Though still at its infancy, this programme will go a long way to compensate for 
the gap in contributory social security coverage and thus reduce the vulnerability of the 
uncovered population in social security.
192
 
After deliberations among stakeholders, RBA in collaboration with National Treasury has set up 
a Working Committee that will spearhead the development of the National Pensions Policy.
193
 
The aim is to redesign the architecture of the pensions system. As a result, it will ensure 
uniformity, coordination and growth of the sector as a whole and thus address all the elements of 
the current fragmented pension system.
194
 
 2.3.1.1.4 The Capital Markets 
The Capital Markets in Kenya are being regulated by the Capital Markets Authority (CMA) 
established by the Capital Markets Act.
195
 They are an equity and bond market where investors 
or the government raise long term funds.
196
 This makes it a very important part of the financial 
sector. CMA’s key role is to create an environment that is conducive to the growth and 
development of the capital markets.
197
 It is responsible for prudential, supervision and conduct of 
business of the securities exchange and other market intermediaries.
198
 
The Kenyan capital markets have experienced a lack luster performance over the years. 
Comparatively though, they have had a fair growth. Nairobi Securities Exchange was established 
in 1954 and it was registered as a company.
199
 It was exclusive for the Europeans at the time of 
establishment. After independence in 1963, Africans were allowed to trade in the Nairobi 
Securities Exchange. The sector experienced dismal growth mainly due to its small size and the 
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slow economic growth of the country.
200
 This necessitated reforms to revamp it to ensure it 
contributes to the economic growth of the country.
201
 
1n 1989, the Capital Markets Authority (CMA) was established
202
 as the regulator. This gave a 
re-birth of the sector as the regulator was given autonomy to develop the capital markets in the 
country.
203
 This is despite the influence of the Ministry of Finance. Nairobi Securities Exchange 
(NSE) was given double responsibilities for development and regulation of the market operations 
to ensure efficient trading.
204
 CMA is however the overall regulator of the sector and thus NSE, 
which is the only securities exchange in Kenya, is subject to its authority. Since the 
establishment of the regulator, the sector has experienced growth following numerous reform 
initiatives introduced by it in a bid to develop and increase participation in the capital markets.
205
  
It goes without saying that a sound and effective regulatory framework plays a critical role in the 
development of the securities market. CMA has tried to adhere to international practices in 
strengthening capital markets. The International Organization for Securities Commission 
(IOSCO) has three main goals of security regulation which include protecting investors, reducing 
systemic risks and ensuring that markets are fair, efficient and transparent.
206
 CMA has 
endeavored to adhere to these goals. Key among the initiatives undertaken by CMA include 
establishment of an Investor Compensation Fund and Capital Markets Fraud Investigation Unit. 
This will boost public confidence in capital markets. It has also launched an anonymous 
reporting portal in 2016 to enable whistle blowers to report malpractices in the sector and has 
entered into an agreement with International Finance Corporation (IFC) to strengthen corporate 
governance.
207
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The factors influencing growth and development of the sector include strong regulatory and legal 
framework, good macroeconomic environment, investor education and awareness, improved 
market infrastructure and increased participation by foreign investors. There is need to 
continuously build on the progress being made on these factors. While building on the strengths 
CMA should also work on the challenges. They include among others political interference, 
corporate governance issues and fraud which have bedeviled the sector.
208
 The regulator will 
thus have to put in concerted efforts to reduce effects of the changes so as to contribute to 
economic growth in the country.    
2.3.1.1.5 Savings and Credit Cooperative Societies (SACCOs) 
The Kenyan financial sector has a well-established Savings and Credit Cooperative Societies 
(SACCOs) sector. The deposit-taking SACCOs are regulated by Sacco Societies Regulatory 
Authority (SASRA) established under the Sacco Societies Act.
209
 The sector is governed by the 
Sacco Societies Act, the Cooperative Societies Act
210
 and the various regulations made by the 
Cabinet Secretary pursuant to the Acts.  
The history of cooperatives in Kenya dates back to 1908 and has had tremendous growth since 
then.
211
 During this period, cooperatives were being registered as companies under the 
Companies Act. This continued until 1931 when the Cooperative Ordinance was promulgated 
and thus the start of registration of cooperatives. The membership, as it was in many other 
sectors, was restricted to the white settlers until 1946 when Africans were allowed to be 
members of Cooperatives.
212
 As a result, many Kenyans started cooperatives as a way of 
investment.
213
 This was also due to the fact that they could not bank with many banks which 
were foreign owned.
214
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After independence in 1963, the cooperative movement was given a re-birth with a focus on 
eradication of poverty by the government. This was actualized through Sessional Paper No. 10 of 
1965 on “African Socialism”. There was an impetus to rapid Africanization of the economy and 
eradication of poverty based on principles similar to those of the Cooperative movement. The 
sector grew over the years with various government initiatives geared towards effective 
management and operation of the cooperatives.
215
 This culminated with the enactment of the 
Cooperative Societies Act
216
 in 1997 where the government’s role in the affairs of cooperative 
societies was removed in a bid to give members full control of the cooperative movement and 
thus improved efficiency in the operation of cooperatives. This is with a backdrop of 
mismanagement through government’s interference.217 
In recognition of the growing importance and sophistication of SACCOs, a Sacco Societies 
Act
218
 was enacted in 2008. The Act provides for licensing, regulation, supervision and 
promotion of Sacco Societies and establishment of the regulator, Sacco Societies Regulatory 
Authority (SASRA). The main goal for the regulator is to enforce prudential standards for 
deposit-taking SACCOs in the country. With this development, the revenue base and 
performance of SACCOs has greatly improved.
219
 This is for the reason that SACCOs can now 
diversify their services beyond their traditional customer base which has mainly been restricted 
to the members.
220
 SASRA has enhanced efficiency and regulation of the sector through various 
initiatives on liquidity, qualification of managers, inspection and inquiries among others.
221
   
Kenya has been rated by the International Cooperative Alliance as the first in Africa and seventh 
globally among the developed cooperative movements.
222
 As a result, Kenya was admitted to the 
group 10 of the most developed Sacco movements globally with its representative being the 
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Kenya Union of Savings and Credit Cooperative Limited (KUSCCO).
223
 This is evidence to the 
developments made in the cooperative movement in Kenya.
224
 However, this does not mean that 
the sector is without challenges. These challenges include, inter alia, governance problems, 
inadequate human resource, weak regulation and inadequate supervision.
225
 There has also been 
a low level of public discourse on SACCOs, mainly because disclosures by SACCOs are 
generally addressed to the members and the regulator.
226
 This, arguably, undermines public 
confidence and reduces the SACCOs’ customer base. 
2.3.1.2 The Unregulated Financial Sector 
Kenya has a huge part of the financial sector that is unregulated by any specific regulator. This 
includes mobile money transfer, non-deposit taking micro-finance institutions and the 
unregulated SACCOs. The operations in this unregulated part of the financial sector have 
continued un-abated with minimum interference from the government oblivious of the inherent 
risks involved. Even though there are government departments responsible for these specific 
segments of the financial sector, they cannot be termed as regulators in the strict sense of the 
meaning of a regulator. It is against this backdrop that the aforementioned segments of the 
financial sector will be discussed. 
2.3.1.2.1 Mobile Money Transfer 
There has been a continuous increase in mobile money transfer in Africa. Kenya prides itself as 
the global leader in mobile money transfer.
227
 The use of mobile money transfer services has 
been available in Kenya for a long time. Initially, the financial institutions had limited use of 
mobile money transfer services before the entry of telecommunication companies which have 
over the years taken over the market of mobile money transfer in the country.  
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In 2006, there was limited access to formal financial services through banks, micro finance 
institutions and Saccos.
228
 Many Kenyans did not have accounts with the financial institutions 
for the reason that these services were not accessible to the rural population and they were also 
perceived to be expensive.
229
 This created a huge unbanked population. The statics show that 
only 18% of Kenyans operated bank accounts in 2006.
230
 This created an unmet demand for 
efficient, reliable and affordable money transfer services in Kenya. 
In 2007, M-Pesa came in to fill the huge gap. M-Pesa was launched by Safaricom, a 
telecommunication company to facilitate mobile money transfer.
231
 From the launch onwards, 
the transformative nature of M-Pesa has had a deep impact on financial inclusion. Financial 
inclusion has tremendously improved from 19% in 2006 to 67% in 2013.
232
 M-Pesa is nearly 
ubiquitous with the daily lives of Kenyans due to a range of services that include money deposit 
and withdrawal, remittances delivery, bill payment and micro-credit provision.
233
 Other 
telecommunication companies such as ZAP have also introduced this service though their market 
share is infeasible.
234
 
Despite all this growth, mobile money transfer in Kenya has had little or no regulation. The 
Communications Authority is the regulator of mobile service providers. Its role is limited to the 
communication aspect. It was not until 2014 when the National Payment Service Regulations 
2014 were enacted to give room for some control of CBK on mobile money transfer services and 
specifically M-Pesa. This was pursuant to the National Payment System Act in 2011.
235
 
However, many authors such as Muwanguzi have attributed this growth to the lean regulation 
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given to Safaricom in mobile money transfer. This is without considering that the technology 
used to deliver mobile money services carries inherent threats such as operational risks, financial 
fraud and money laundering.
236
 There is thus the need to fully regulate this sector. 
2.3.1.2.2 Non-Deposit Taking Micro-Finance Institutions 
The deposit-taking micro-finance institutions are regulated by CBK. The Micro-Finance Act
237
 
of 2006 was enacted to give the regulatory role of deposit-taking micro finance institutions to the 
CBK. This left the non-deposit taking micro-finance institutions without any specific regulator. 
As a result, a gap has been left in the regulation of the micro-finance institutions in the country.   
Since 2006, the non- deposit taking micro-finance institutions have continued to operate without 
any interference from any of the financial regulators. They offer various financial services such 
as credit to their customers. Without a substantive regulator, the customers are at risk in the use 
of these financial services, with risks such as unfair and lopsided terms of credit.
238
 This calls for 
the policy makers to provide the necessary regulation for the proper management and 
functioning of non-deposit taking micro-finance institutions in the country.  
2.3.1.2.3 The Unregulated SACCOs 
The establishment of the Sacco Societies Regulatory Authority led to a new regime in the 
regulation of SACCOs. This entailed licensing of SACCOs with front office service activity.
239
 
The other aspect of regulation relates to setting prudential requirements, governance, reporting 
requirements among other.
240
 As a result many SACCOs did not meet these requirements and 
thus were not licensed.  
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The SACCOs that did not meet the requirements by SASRA have continued to operate.
241
 They 
are registered and supervised by the Office of the Commissioner of Co-operatives Development 
established under the Cooperatives Act.
242
 However, this is not a regulator per se. The 
registration of all SACCOs is done by this office and the SACCOs that meet the requirements of 
SASRA go ahead to be licensed and operate within its regulatory framework. This leaves a huge 
gap in the operation of the SACCOs not licensed by SASRA all at the expense of the consumers 
of financial services 
2.4 Reform Bills 
In the recent times, two Bills have been drafted, in a bid to make proposals for reform to the 
financial sector regulation in Kenya. These Bills are the Financial Services Authority Bill, (FSA) 
2016, and the Financial Markets Conduct Bill, 2018. 
The FSA Bill has the following stated objective, as captured in the preamble thereto: 
…to provide for the establishment of uniform norms and standards in relation to the 
conduct of providers of financial products and financial services, the establishment of the 
Financial Services Authority, the Financial Sector Ombudsman and the Financial Sector 
Tribunal, the promotion and maintenance of a fair and efficient financial sector in Kenya, 
and for connected purposes. 
The key highlight of the FSA Bill is the establishment of the Financial Services Authority.
243
 The 
functions of the Authority include, inter alia, the regulation and supervision of prudentially 
regulated financial institutions and the regulation and supervision of the conduct of financial 
institutions.
244
 What is clear from the functions of the Financial Services Authority as enshrined 
in the Bill is that an attempt is made to merge both prudential and market conduct regulation 
under a single body – the Financial Services Authority.245 The essence of this is that the Bill 
seems to set the stage for a unified regulator. 
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However, it has to be pointed out that the Financial Services Authority is intended to have 
jurisdiction only on certain sections of the financial sector, which include insurance, pensions, 
SACCOs and capital markets.
246
 In particular, the definition of financial institutions that fall 
under the regulation of the Financial Services Authority excludes Central Bank supervised 
entities.
247
  
Indeed, the Financial Services Authority is intended to take over the roles of what the Bill refers 
to as predecessor regulators, which are outlined as being the Capital Markets Authority 
established by the Capital Markets Act, the Insurance Regulatory Authority established by the 
Insurance Act, the Retirement Benefits Authority established by the Retirement Benefits Act, 
and the Sacco Societies Regulatory Authority established by the Sacco Act.
248
 
The FSA Bill is a half-hearted attempt to introduce the unified model of financial regulation in 
Kenya. It is half-hearted because the Bill establishes a uniform regulator for only certain 
financial institutions, while excluding others.
249
 The disadvantages of having a unified regulator 
have already been pointed out at Section 2.2.2 above.  
While some of these, in particular the potential for ill-defined objectives due to the single 
regulator having charge over an assortment of heterogenous institutions may be somewhat 
mitigated by the fact that the regulatory function is shared between the Financial Services 
Authority and the Central Bank, this disadvantage remains to the extent that the Financial 
Services Authority still has charge over a number of sectors that have different regulator 
demands. In this sense therefore, the FSA Bill does not portend an amelioration of the subsisting 
challenges, especially as far as consumer protection in the financial sector is concerned. 
The Financial Markets Conduct Regulation Bill, 2018, on the other hand, is a bill to promote a 
fair, non-discriminatory marketplace for access to credit, provide for the establishment of 
uniform practices and standards in relation to the conduct of providers of financial products and 
financial services, including regulating the cost of credit, establishment of the Financial Markets 
Conduct Authority, the Financial Sector Ombudsman and the Financial Sector Tribunal, 
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supervision of conduct of providers in relation to retail financial customers, promotion and 
maintenance of a fair and efficient financial sector in Kenya, and for connected purposes.
250
 
At Section 11 thereof, the bill establishes the Financial Markets Conduct Authority with a two-
fold mandate as far as consumer protection is concerned: protect retail financial services 
customers, and protect retail financial customers with respect to credit.
251
  
As to the former, the Authority protects customers from misleading, deceptive, unfair and 
fraudulent conduct; by promoting fair, equitable and sustainable access to financial products and 
financial services; by ensuring that retail financial customers can make informed choices through 
the provision of useful information about financial products and services; and by promoting 
financial literacy and the ability of retail financial customers and potential retail financial 
customers to make sound financial decisions.
252
  
As regards the latter, the Authority protects customers by regulating the cost of credit; from 
inappropriate lending practices; and by regulating the accuracy, availability and protection of 
financial information through credit sharing mechanisms.
253
 
It is clear from the constitutional provisions of the Financial Markets Conduct Authority that it is 
focused primarily on market conduct regulation. This is a function that the Financial Services 
Authority under the FSA Bill discussed above also seems to have.
254
 There is therefore an 
overlap of functions between the two Authorities established in the bills, and this begs the 
question whether, these two bills are intended to complement each other, or if they provide 
alternative legislative proposals. On the other hand, if the Financial Markets Conduct Authority 
Bill is to be deemed as an independent Bill (at least independent from the FSA Bill), the 
consequence will be that while the market conduct regulation function will be focused under one 
body (the Financial Markets Conduct Authority), the prudential function will still follow the 
sectoral model due to the structure provided therein. Such a situation does not fall within any of 
the conventional regulatory approaches, and, in any case, is likely to engender coordination and 
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information sharing difficulties, as well as undermine the development of harmonised regulatory 
policies.  
2.5 Conclusion 
As the foregoing discussion has demonstrated, Kenya has a sectoral model of financial regulation 
with five regulators. The banking sector is regulated by Central Bank of Kenya, the insurance 
sector is regulated by the Insurance Regulatory Authority, the capital markets are regulated by 
Capital Markets Authority, the pensions sector is regulated by the Retirements Benefits 
Authority and the Savings and Credit Cooperative Societies are regulated by Sacco Societies 
Regulatory Authority. There is also an unregulated part of the financial sector. This includes 
mobile phone-based money transfer, non-deposit taking micro-finance institutions and un-
regulated SACCOs. The current regulatory framework is inherent with regulatory gaps, 
duplication, overlaps, inconsistent regulations and cost ineffectiveness. As a result, this 
necessitates the need to look into the effectiveness of the current fragmented regulatory system in 
ensuring consumer protection, stability of the economy among other factors for sustainable 
growth. This is with a view to provide a viable regulatory model that will address all the 
challenges inherent in the current regulatory framework.  
The decision to merge four regulators through the draft Financial Services Authority Bill as a 
measure to save regulatory costs does not solve the inherent regulatory issues in the current 
regulatory framework, and so does the decision to merge market conduct regulation through the 
draft Financial Markets Conduct Bill. In any case, there seems to be an overlap between the 
functions of the Financial Services Authority and the Financial Markets Conduct Authority, to 
the extent that both have jurisdiction over market conduct regulation.  
Chapter Three introduces the consumer protection imperatives that the Constitution and 
legislation establishes, as a benchmark for assessing the efficacy of the current sectoral 
framework for financial regulation. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
3 CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE KENYAN FINANCIAL SECTOR 
3.1 Introduction 
The stability of the financial sector is dependent on various factors. Key among them is the 
ability of the financial regulators to cushion consumers of financial services from malpractices 
such as unfair lending practices from unscrupulous financial services providers. This is 
especially important in the financial sector for the reason that financial services are inherently 
more complex than most goods or other more tangible services.
255
 It thus needs to be perpetually 
monitored in tandem with the dynamism of the financial services sector. 
The Constitution of Kenya 2010, as will be discussed later, provides a right to consumer 
protection.
256
  The Kenya Vision 2030, which provides the blueprint for growth in the country, 
has broad goals that include promoting financial inclusion, improving transparency, affordability 
of financial services and increasing competition in the sector to benefit consumers and the 
overall economy.
257
 It further envisages a developed, vibrant and stable financial system.
258
 
There is a strong emphasis on financial stability. This entails considering all the factors that will 
guarantee financial stability and includes financial consumer protection. The need to strengthen 
financial consumer protection can thus not be over-emphasized.  
There are established principles for good business practice in the financial services sector. They 
include fair and equitable treatment, commercial behavior, disclosure and transparency, 
education and awareness raising, protection of privacy and consumer complaints and disputes.
259
 
These principles are key determinants in providing financial consumer protection. The 
achievement of each and every principle hereinabove enhances consumer protection. It is in light 
of these principles that the research paper will endeavour to make an assessment of the Kenyan 
legal framework in financial consumer protection. 
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This Chapter will discuss consumer protection in the Kenyan financial sector. Firstly, it will 
capture the conceptual framework. This will mean defining the meaning of the key word, 
consumer, and the meaning of financial consumer protection and the rationale for financial 
consumer protection. In doing so, it will contextualize the use of the words in the discussion 
thereafter. Secondly, it will discuss the legal framework of financial consumer protection in 
Kenya. This will entail discussing the constitutional provisions on consumer protection, the 
available legislation on consumer protection and provisions on consumer protection in the sector-
specific legislation. Lastly, it will give a conclusion to the discussion.  
3.2 Conceptual Framework  
For a proper understanding of this Chapter, it is important to conceptualize the meanings of 
consumer, consumer protection and the rationale for consumer protection. By doing so, an 
objective assessment of how financial consumer protection is provided in the Kenyan financial 
sector will be undertaken.  
3.2.1 Who is a Consumer? 
The Black’s Law Dictionary defines a consumer as someone who buys goods or services for 
personal, family, or household use, with no intention of resale; a natural person who uses 
products for personal rather than business purposes.
260
 
The Kenya Consumer Protection Act, 
261
 captures a broad definition of the meaning of consumer 
as— 
a) a person to whom particular goods or services are marketed in the ordinary 
course of the supplier's business; 
b) a person who has entered into a transaction with a supplier in the ordinary 
course of the supplier's business, unless the transaction is exempt from the 
application of this Act; 
c) a user of particular goods or a recipient or beneficiary of particular services, 
irrespective of whether that user, recipient or beneficiary was a party to a 
transaction concerning the supply of those particular goods and services; and 
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d) a franchisee in terms of a franchise agreement, to the extent applicable in 
terms of this Act.
262
 
From the above definitions, it can be deduced that the Black’s Law Dictionary defines a 
consumer as a natural person. The Kenyan Consumer Protection Act, on the other hand, defines a 
consumer broadly to mean both natural and artificial persons. The use of the words “user” and 
“franchise” can attest to reference to an artificial person. As a result, the research paper will 
adopt the later definition in the Kenyan Act for the reason that it captures broadly various 
elements of consumer protection. The provision in the Consumer Protection Act, however, is 
generally and not specific to consumers of financial services. In this regard, the definition of a 
consumer in the Consumer Protection Act is adapted, for the purposes of this research paper, to 
the extent that the goods and services under references are those provided by financial services 
providers. 
3.2.2 What is Financial Consumer Protection? 
There is no standard definition to financial consumer protection. Generally, it is about ensuring a 
fair exchange between providers and consumers of financial services.
263
 It entails measures 
meant to safeguard consumers of goods and services from unfair market practices and fraudulent 
transactions.
264
 The research paper will adopt the aforementioned meaning for the purpose of 
discussing consumer protection in the Kenyan financial system. To that effect, the necessary 
evaluation of the available legal framework on consumer protection and compliance by the 
regulators in the financial sector will be undertaken. 
3.2.3 What is the rationale for Financial Consumer Protection? 
In 2016, The United Nations came up with a Manual on Consumer Protection. It captures 
broadly the essentials of consumer protection. The rationale provided for financial consumer 
protection is that it addresses disparities found in the consumer-supplier relationship which 
includes bargaining power, knowledge and resources and that state intervention is necessary for 
economic efficiency, individual rights, distributive justice and right to development.
265
 As a 
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result, financial consumer protection is undertaken. This is the basic rationale for financial 
consumer protection. 
3.3 Legal framework on consumer protection in Kenya  
The legal framework on consumer protection is provided for by the Constitution, the Consumer 
Protection Act, the Competition Act, several sector-specific statutes and the relevant regulations 
or guidelines enacted pursuant to this substantive legislation. The effectiveness of the regulators 
in enforcement is thus assessed against the provisions provided for by the aforementioned laws. 
It is against this background that a detailed discussion on each of the aforementioned laws is 
conducted.  
3.3.1 The Constitution 
The need for consumer protection was evident during the Constitution making process prior to 
2010. This is because Kenya had no substantive law governing consumer protection. With the 
promulgation of the Constitution of Kenya 2010, a right to consumer protection was entrenched 
as a part of the Bill of Rights. It provides as follows; 
Consumers have the right
266— 
a) to goods and services of reasonable quality; 
b) to the information necessary for them to gain full benefit from goods and services; 
c) to the protection of their health, safety, and economic interests; and 
d) to compensation for loss or injury arising from defects in goods or services. 
From this provision, there is a deliberate emphasis on quality, information, protection and 
compensation. These are key elements in ensuring the consumer is provided the necessary 
protection. As a result, financial consumer protection is a constitutional right and it ought to be 
treated as such. This bestows enormous responsibility on the regulators of the financial sector to 
inculcate and enforce it. What this implies in terms of financial regulation is, arguably, that the 
approach in place must be such that it secures the constitutional imperatives on consumer 
protection. In addition to setting out specific entitlements for consumers, the Constitution also 
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mandated Parliament to enact legislation within a specified timeline to provide for consumer 
protection. This culminated with the enactment of the Consumer Protection Act, 2012.
267
   
3.3.2 The Consumer Protection Act 
This Act was mainly to provide for the protection of the consumer and prevent unfair trade 
practices in consumer transactions.
268
 Broadly, the Act provides for, inter alia, consumer rights, 
what it considers unfair practices, rights and obligations in consumer agreements, consumer 
remedies and a consumer protection advisory committee.
269
 The Consumer Protection Act, as 
pointed out above, is a general statute that applies to the protection of all consumers, including 
those of financial services. This Act therefore forms a logical starting point on the discourse on 
consumer protection, because it formulates the basic tenets of consumer protection overall. The 
Act captures varied aspects on financial consumer protection. 
The Act provides for its purpose as being to promote and advance social and economic welfare 
of consumers by, among others, establishing a legal framework for the achievement and 
maintenance of a consumer market that is fair, accessible, efficient, sustainable and responsible 
for the benefit of consumers generally; reducing and ameliorating any disadvantages experienced 
in accessing any supply of goods or services by consumers; promoting fair and ethical business 
practices and protecting consumers from all forms and means of unconscionable, unfair, 
unreasonable, unjust or otherwise improper trade practices including deceptive, misleading, 
unfair or fraudulent conduct.
270
 These are issues that ought to be addressed in financial consumer 
protection. 
Further, the Act provides for consumer rights.
271
 These rights include, inter alia, the right to 
quality goods and services, the right not to be charged for assistance to obtain a benefit and the 
right to commence proceedings. These rights are read together with the constitutional rights 
entrenched in the Bill of Rights and rights provided in other consumer protection provisions in 
the different segments of the financial sector.  
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Furthermore, the Act also provides for what it considers unfair practices, though not a conclusive 
list, and goes ahead to prohibit these. In doing so, it not only gives room for what it might not 
have captured but also gives certainty as to the meaning of unfair practices.
272
 This is necessary 
especially for the financial services sector which is very dynamic and complex giving room to 
unfair practices among the providers of financial services that may be unforeseeable. It goes 
further to provide for the rights and obligations respecting specific consumer agreements.
273
 
The establishment of the consumer protection advisory committee is a great achievement in the 
enforcement of consumer rights in Kenya. The main reason for this is that it will monitor cross-
sectoral threats to consumer protection. The functions are provided as, among others, advising 
the Cabinet Secretary and ensuring relevant action on all aspects relating to consumer protection; 
formulation of policy relating to this Act and legislative proposals in the interest of consumers 
and the modification, consolidation or updating of legislation providing protection to consumers 
'in the areas covered under, or related to this Act. 
Further to this, it also provides the co-ordination and networking of consumer activities and the 
development of linkages with consumer organizations and the competent authorities and 
agencies locally and outside Kenya for the protection of consumer interests and promotion or 
participation in consumer education programmes, locally and elsewhere, and activities, the 
dissemination of consumer issues with a view to proposing corrective measures and doing 
anything or all things that are necessary, expedient or convenient for or in connection with the 
performance of its functions under this Act.
274
 
The functions as provided hereinabove are broad to promote consumer protection measures in 
Kenya. Even though the Act is not specific to the financial sector, it remains a great milestone in 
the advancement of consumer protection measures in the country. For enforcement, collaboration 
between the financial sector regulators on one hand and the government, non-governmental 
organizations such as Consumer Federation of Kenya (COFEK) and other stakeholders on the 
other hand is important. Further, the Cabinet Secretary of Trade and Industry is given authority 
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by the Act pass regulations for the better implementation of the Act.
275
 However, while it is 
acknowledged that the Consumer Protection Act is a remarkable achievement as far as consumer 
protection generally is concerned, it must be made clear that the generality of the Act means that 
it does not necessarily address issues that are specific to financial regulation, which require 
unique regulatory approaches, as will be demonstrated in Chapter Four. 
3.3.3 The Competition Act 
The Competition Act was enacted in 2010.
276
 Its key objects are to promote and safeguard 
competition in the national economy, protect consumers from unfair and misleading market 
conduct, provide for the establishment, powers and functions of the Competition Authority and 
the Competition Tribunal.  
Before the enactment of the Consumer Protection Act in 2012, the Competition Act was the only 
legislation that had largely captured consumer protection provisions.
277
 It had provisions akin to 
those in the current Consumer Protection Act. It made it an offence to make false misleading 
representations to consumers
278
 or engage in unconscionable conduct in relation to the supply of 
goods and services.
279
 Further, it had broad restrictions that afford the Competition Authority 
wide investigative discretions.
280
 This empowers the Authority to perform its functions and at the 
same time protect consumers. 
However, a major weakness of the Act lies in its generality. As a general consumer protection 
law, the Act does not necessarily respond to the peculiarities of the financial services sector. 
Financial services and products are unique in certain respects, relative to other goods and 
services, and this uniqueness calls for more targeted legislation to address consumer protection 
needs. Even within the financial services sector itself, the regulatory needs of insurance 
companies, for instance, are very different from those of banks and capital markets. Therefore, 
the general stipulations of the Consumer Protection Act may not be targeted and specific enough 
to satisfy the consumer protection needs of the financial services sector. In other words, such 
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general stipulations provide financial service provides with elbowroom wide enough that they 
may have several options some of which may not necessarily achieve optimal consumer 
protection. 
3.3.4 Sector-Specific Acts 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the financial sector in Kenya has five key sectors regulated by 
independent regulators. These sectors are banking regulated by CBK, insurance regulated by 
IRA, capital markets regulated by CMA, pensions regulated by RBA and savings and credit 
cooperative societies regulated by SASRA. They all have legislation governing them and 
establishing the regulators.  
Though previously mentioned, the legislations governing them include Central Bank of Kenya 
Act,
281
 Banking Act,
282
 Insurance Act,
283
 Capital Markets Authority Act,
284
 Retirement Benefits 
Authority Act
285
 and Sacco Societies Act
286
. The consumer protection provisions available in 
each of these Acts will be discussed below. 
3.3.4.1 The Central Bank of Kenya Act 
The Act establishes the CBK,
287
 and provides for its operations therein. CBK is the regulator of 
the banking sector in Kenya. As a result, it formulates and implements monetary policy directed 
to achieving and maintaining stability, foster the liquidity, solvency and proper functioning of a 
stable market-based financial system and support the economic policy of the government.
288
 It 
exercises regulatory and supervisory roles over the banking sector. 
In exercising its regulatory and supervisory roles over banks and deposit-taking micro finance 
institutions, CBK enacts regulations and guidelines to that effect. This is in a bid to increase 
efficiency and stability in the financial sector. Though the Act fails to define a specific mandate 
for consumer protection, CBK’s regulatory and supervisory functions in the banking sector are 
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geared towards protecting consumers.
289
 This is because, while much of the regulatory function 
of the CBK is prudential, there is no doubt that prudential regulation is itself important in 
ensuring the health and stability of financial institutions, and this is key to consumer protection 
because the collapse of such institutions is arguably, the ultimate blow to consumer interests.
290
  
3.3.4.2 Banking Act, 2016 
The Act establishes the framework for CBK to regulate the conduct of banks in the interest of 
consumer protection.
291
 Broadly, it provides among others licensing of institutions to undertake 
banking business, provides for prohibited business in banking, provides for reserves and 
dividends, accounts and audit, information and reporting requirements and inspection and 
control. All these facilitate the regulating of the sector. 
The Act prohibits imposition of charges on savings, seven-day call or fixed deposits accounts. 
Instead, the banking institution shall pay interest accruing to the account.
292
 This is aimed at 
protecting consumers from unnecessary charges on their accounts. This is with a backdrop of 
various classes of charges levied on various accounts by Kenyan banks
293
 without the necessary 
approvals being undertaken by CBK. 
Before the establishment of the legislation on deposit insurance,
294
 the Banking Act established 
Deposit Protection Fund Board (DPFB) under Section 36 thereof. This fund is meant to 
compensate depositors upon collapse of banks. Though the amount is limited to 1000 US Dollars 
and to individual depositors, it came as a relief to many Kenyans who have fallen victim of bank 
failure. 
The Act goes further to limit the interest recoverable from defaulted loans.
295
 This provision 
prohibits the increase of interest by banks on defaulting loans. Various restrictive measures are 
also undertaken by CBK to ensure it effectively regulates banking institutions. CBK is further 
empowered to impose penalties through regulations on non-compliance with the Act or 
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prudential guidelines that it stipulates.
296
 It is worth noting that the Act does not expressly 
provide for a dispute resolution mechanism. From the foregoing, the Act gives a fair measure of 
consumer protection in the banking sector. Though limited to banking services within the sector, 
the regulator, CBK, has the necessary functions and powers to ensure financial consumer 
protection. A handicap of the regulatory framework in this sector, however, is that new 
technology-driven forms of banking, such as mobile phone banking, are not sufficiently 
regulated. This makes it inadequate to proper cushion consumers of the financial services.  
3.3.4.3 The Insurance Act 
The Act establishes IRA,
297
 the regulator of the sector. The objects and functions of the regulator 
are provided as, among others, ensure the effective administration, supervision, regulation and 
control of insurance and reinsurance business in Kenya; formulate and enforce standards for the 
conduct of insurance and reinsurance business in Kenya; license all persons involved in or 
connected with insurance business, including insurance and reinsurance companies, insurance 
and reinsurance intermediaries, loss adjusters and assessors, risk surveyors and valuers and 
protect the interests of insurance policy holders and insurance beneficiaries in any insurance 
contract. 
Further to these, it also promotes the development of the insurance sector; advise the 
Government on the national policy to be followed in order to ensure adequate insurance 
protection and security for national assets and national properties; Issue supervisory guidelines 
and prudential standards from time to time, for better administration of the insurance business of 
persons licensed under the Act; conduct inquiries and share information with other regulatory 
authorities and to carry out any other related activities in furtherance of its supervisory role; and 
undertake such other functions as may be conferred on it by this Act or by any other written 
law.
298
  
From the regulator’s functions, the protection of the interests of policy holders and beneficiaries 
in any insurance contract has been provided. This is important in the regulator’s efforts to 
enhance public confidence in the sector and thus encourage more Kenyans to take policies with 
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insurance companies. It is especially with a backdrop of low penetration and a stagnated growth 
of the sector over the years. 
The Act provides for a dispute resolution mechanism. It gives the Cabinet Secretary power to 
establish a Tribunal to hear appeals from the Act.
299
 This is important in financial consumer 
protection. Further, it provides for the policy holders compensation fund.
300
 The Cabinet 
Secretary is empowered to establish this fund to compensate policy holders in case an insurance 
company is wound up.
301
 The compensation however is limited to a specified amount. It also 
gives the Cabinet Secretary power to enact regulations for the better implementation of the Act. 
One challenge with the framework in the insurance sector, however, is that the overall challenge 
facing the regulation of the Kenyan financial sector – the system is sectoral. This creates 
challenges, for example, with the emergence of entities that provide services that do not fall 
under a single specific sector, for example, where institutions licensed as banks also provide 
insurance services, or communication service providers also offering insurance services.
302
 
3.3.4.4 Capital Markets Authority Act 
The Act establishes CMA,
303
 for the purpose of promoting, regulating and facilitating the 
development of an orderly, fair and efficient Capital Markets in Kenya. The regulator is 
responsible for prudential, supervision and conduct of business of the securities exchange and 
other market intermediaries. Among its objects is protection of investor interests.
304
 This is 
important in promotion of the interests of the consumers in the sector and thus enhancement of 
investor confidence. 
Further, the Act establishes the Investor Compensation Fund. This Fund compensates investors 
who suffer pecuniary loss resulting from the failure of a licensed stockbroker or dealer to meet 
his contractual obligations and paying beneficiaries from collected unclaimed dividends when 
they resurface.
305
 It also prohibits insider trading which gives an undue advantage against other 
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investors.
306
 Insider trading erodes investor confidence in the securities exchange and thus the 
need to prohibit it. 
Furthermore, it also establishes the Capital Markets Tribunal.
307
 The tribunal entertains appeals 
from the capital markets.
308
 Dispute resolution is an essential element in consumer protection. It 
is thus prudent to provide for it in ensuring efficient capital markets. Like in other legislations, 
the Act empowers the Cabinet Secretary to issue rules and regulations.
309
 These rules and 
regulations, together with the regulator’s guidelines and notices, enable efficient and effective 
management of capital markets in Kenya.   Furthermore, the efficacy of the Capital Markets 
Authority Act, insofar as consumer protection is concerned, should be understood in the context 
of the shortcomings of the extant regulatory system, which is sectoral. 
3.3.4.5 Retirements Benefits Authority Act
310
 
The Act establishes the RBA
311
 for the regulation, supervision and promotion of retirement 
benefits schemes and the development of the pensions sector. Broadly, it provides for the 
establishment of the regulator, registration of benefits schemes, regulation and supervision of 
schemes and inspection and appointment of interim administrators among others. 
The objects and functions of the regulator are to regulate and supervise the establishment and 
management of retirement benefits schemes; protect the interests of members and sponsors of 
retirement benefits sector; promote the development of the retirement benefits sector; advise the 
Minister on the national policy to be followed with regard to retirement benefits schemes and to 
implement all Government policies relating thereto and perform such other functions as are 
conferred on it by this Act or by any other written law.
312
 
From the objects, it is clear that the regulator has to protect the interests of members and 
sponsors to the schemes. Further, the Act provides for a restriction on the use of scheme funds.
313
 
This is for example in the giving of loans or invested contrary to guidelines prescribed. For the 
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development of the pensions sector, it is necessary to ensure prudence in the investment of the 
members’ funds.  
The Act also provides for a dispute resolution mechanism. A person dissatisfied with a decision 
of the manager, administrator, custodians or trustees of the scheme may appeal to the Chief 
Executive Officer to review such decision with a view to ensuring that such decision is made in 
accordance with the provisions of the relevant scheme rues and the Act under which the scheme 
is established.
314
 Further, it establishes an Appeals Tribunal to entertain disputes from the Chief 
Executive Officer.
315
 The process is thus well established before resorting to the courts. The 
Cabinet Secretary is also given authority to enact regulations for the proper implementation of 
the Act.
316
 However, the dispute resolution mechanisms have not adequately protected the 
consumer.  
3.3.4.6 Sacco Societies Act317 
The Act establishes SASRA
318
 and makes provision for the licensing, regulation, supervision and 
promotion of Sacco societies. The regulator has its objects and functions as to license Sacco 
societies to carry out deposit-taking business in accordance with this Act; regulate and supervise 
Sacco societies; hold, manage and apply the General Fund of the Authority in accordance with 
the provisions of this Act; levy contributions in accordance with this Act; do all such other things 
as may be lawfully directed by the Minister and perform such other functions as are conferred on 
it by this Act or by any other written law.
319
 
The regulatory and supervisory roles of the regulator enable deposit-taking Sacco societies to 
provide services taking into consideration the interest of the consumers. The regulator has also 
power to revoke licenses in cases of non-compliance with the Act or when a Sacco society 
engages in criminal or fraudulent acts.
320
 Considering the importance and the development of 
Sacco movement in Kenya, these roles by the regulator are fundamental for the stability of the 
Sacco sector. 
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The Act also establishes the Deposit Guarantee Fund. This is for protection of members’ 
deposits.
321
 The amount limit is 1000 US Dollars.
322
 On the dispute resolution mechanisms, the 
Sacco societies will use the Cooperative Tribunal
323
 under the Cooperative Societies Act.
324
 The 
fund and the tribunal are essential elements in consumer protection. Further, the Cabinet 
Secretary is empowered to make regulations for the better implementation of the Sacco Societies 
Act
325
 and the Cooperative Societies Act
326
 governing the Sacco sector.  
From the foregoing discussion on the sector-specific laws, each of the regulators has a restricted 
mandate to enforce consumer protection within its sector. It is worth noting that the provision of 
financial services has been diversified. For example, there are banking institutions offering 
insurance services. As a result, these banking institutions are regulated by CBK for their banking 
activities and IRA for their insurance activities. This essentially means the application of 
consumer protection provisions of the two Acts that are different, all for the same purpose. CBK 
further applies different regulations to deposit-taking microfinance institutions.  
Though there are a few similarities on dispute resolution mechanisms in SASRA, IRA, CMA and 
RBA, the procedures and the applicable laws are different. This creates inconsistencies and 
ineffectiveness in providing financial consumer protection. This is further exacerbated by a huge 
unregulated part of the financial sector which has little or no financial consumer protection. It 
can thus be deduced that the Kenyan sectoral model of financial regulation, as discussed in 
Chapter Two above, and the legal framework hereinabove, are an inefficient framework that 
cannot be relied upon to protect financial consumers. They overall underlying challenge that the 
framework faces, lies in the fact that it is a sectoral model. The shortcomings of the sectoral 
model of financial regulation, as discussed in Chapter Two, are therefore attendant to Kenya’s 
model.  
3.4 Conclusion 
The Constitution of Kenya entrenches consumer protection as part of the Bill of rights. Pursuant 
to this constitutional right, substantive legislation on consumer protection was enacted by the 
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Kenyan Parliament in 2012.
327
 Though not specific to financial consumer protection, it attempts 
to capture most of the principles for good business practice necessary for consumer protection. 
The various other legislation governing the financial sector have also varied provisions on 
financial consumer protection. This is a manifestation that theoretically, Kenya is not lacking in 
entrenching consumer protection in its laws to say the least. 
From the discussion, the sector-specific legislation has made attempts to provide some 
provisions on consumer protection. With each of the regulators expected to enforce consumer 
protection provisions available in their specific sector-specific legislations together with those in 
the Consumer Protection Act, the effectiveness of each and every regulator in enforcement is 
compromised. This is for the reason that some of the sector-specific legislation do not have 
comprehensive provisions on consumer protection and those that have, are different to each 
other. This is evidence that there are inconsistencies, regulatory arbitrage and uncertainty in 
providing financial consumer protection in the Kenyan financial sector. 
As a result, though consumer protection legislation is in place and that some sector-specific laws 
also have consumer protection provisions, they may not necessarily address the issues specific to 
financial services. The lack of coherence and market oversight in consumer protection, the 
indifference in regulation, overlaps and with each sector having its own regulator for 
enforcement exacerbates the ability of the regulators to provide financial consumer protection in 
the broader financial sector.  
Essentially, the regulatory framework in the Kenyan financial sector, as discussed in Chapter 
two, provides an inherent barrier to proper financial consumer protection. The fact that some 
financial institutions provide diverse services that require regulation by different regulators 
necessitates the need for a market-wide regulator to fully capture the regulatory needs for 
financial consumer protection. The problem is further exacerbated by the complexities and 
novelty of some financial services. With a huge part of the unregulated financial sector in Kenya, 
the need for a market-wide regulator cannot be over-emphasized.     
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Chapter Four presents an argument for a Twin Peaks model of financial regulation, as a possible 
panacea to the shortcomings in the current framework, in so far as consumer protection is 
concerned.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4 TWIN PEAKS REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IN FINANCIAL CONSUMER 
PROTECTION 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters have set the stage for the discussion in this chapter by revisiting the extant 
framework for financial regulation in Kenya, and the legal architecture in place for consumer 
protection. In identifying the various models of financial regulation, emphasis has been placed 
on the respective model’s potential for ensuring consumer protection. It has been demonstrated, 
through critical evaluations of the various models, that consumer protection imperatives as 
prescribed under Kenyan law are hardly met under the current regulatory framework. It is for this 
reason that this chapter develops an argument for the adoption of the Twin Peaks model of 
financial regulation.  
The definitive features of the Twin Peaks model of financial regulation will be the starting point 
of the discussion in this chapter. The two “peaks” of the model – prudential regulation and 
market conduct regulation, will then be analysed, with a view to locating the place of consumer 
protection under this model. The next section of this chapter will consider the Twin Peaks model 
in practice. This section will proceed by way of a case study. Australia, the first country to adopt 
the Twin Peaks model will be used as the focal for the case study. The Australian model will be 
analysed with a bias towards the mechanisms it has to ensure consumer protection. 
Subsequently, a case for the adoption of the twin peaks model of financial regulation in Kenya 
will be made, before concluding the discussion. 
4.2 Twin Peaks Model of Financial Regulation 
4.2.1 Defining the Twin Peaks Model 
The Twin Peaks Model of financial regulation is built to separate the market conduct and 
consumer protection authority from the prudential regulation.
328
 Schmulow, succinctly captures 
the defining character of this model of financial regulation in the following words: 
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‘The Twin Peaks model of financial system regulation calls for the establishment of two, 
independent, peak regulatory bodies, one charged with ensuring safety and soundness in 
the financial system, the other with preventing market misconduct and the abuse of 
consumers in the financial sector.’329 
An insight into the provenance of the Twin Peaks model may be helpful to provide further 
insights into its workings, as well as elaborate on the circumstances of its emergence. This in 
turn would be helpful in latter portions of this work that shall make the case for this model of 
financial regulation in Kenya. 
4.2.2 The Twin Peaks Model: A History 
Although Australia was the first country in the world to implement the Twin Peaks model, the 
model was first proposed for implementation in the United Kingdom.
330
 Taylor first made the 
case for the Twin Peaks model, as the structure for financial regulation that would eliminate the 
challenges that the financial regulation system in the United Kingdom was facing at that time.
331
 
The context in which Taylor made the proposal was characterised by what Taylor described as 
the ‘alphabet soup’ of regulators – numerous regulators for conduct and systemic issues in the 
financial services sector.
332
 Each regulator was assigned a jurisdiction defined by the type of 
entity being regulated.
333
 According to Taylor, the likelihood, and actual incidents, of conflicts of 
interest, confusion and damage were high in such a regulatory set up.
334
 Taylor painted the 
picture of the serendipity that characterised the emergence and development of this regulatory 
framework as thus: 
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‘Britain’s system for regulating financial services, as was once said of its Empire, has 
been acquired in a fit of absence of mind’.335 
The fact that the jurisdiction of each regulator was defined by the type of entity being regulated 
also posed another regulatory challenge. This took the form of the fact that there was an 
increasing ‘blurring of boundaries’ between various financial institutions.336 As Schmulow notes, 
‘[b]anks were combining with insurers and investment banks with stockbroking firms. Added to 
this was the presence of large, systemically important building societies.’337 
It was in light of these difficulties, that Taylor proposed both an institutional framework – the 
Twin Peaks model, and certain principles to undergird the proposed institutional framework.
338
 
Institutionally, Taylor objected to the traditional tripartite distinction of banking, securities and 
insurance.
339
 Instead, Taylor proposed the establishment of a dual-regulatory agency system, 
which would not be informed by the legal nature of the entity being regulated. The proposed 
regulatory agencies were a Financial Stability Commission (FSC) and a Consumer Protection 
Commission (CPC). The FSC would be responsible for ‘the stability of the financial system as a 
whole, primarily through the application of prudential regulations.’ 340  The CPC was to be 
charged with consumer protection – ‘ensuring that firms deal with their (retail) customers in a 
fair and transparent manner.’341  
One part of the financial service regulation (peak) of Taylor’s proposal – as epitomised by the 
FSC, would see the combination of the multiple regulators, previously in charge of insurance, 
securities and banking, into one single regulator responsible for the overall stability of the 
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financial system by regulating bank capital and the control of risk.
342
 In his words, this single 
regulator would address ‘financial soundness of institutions - including capital adequacy and 
large exposure requirements, measures relating to systems, controls and provisioning policies, 
and the vetting of senior managers to ensure that they possessed an appropriate level of 
experience and skill.’343 
The second peak of Taylor’s proposal, that of market conduct regulation, was to ensure that 
consumers were treated fairly and honestly and that they were shielded from ‘fraud, 
incompetence, or the abuse of market power.’344 To ensure this, the market conduct regulator 
could take measures such as restrictions on the advertising, marketing and sale of financial 
products, as well as minimum fit and proper standards for salespeople.
345
 
For the underlying principles, Taylor also had suggestions. First, that in a modern financial 
system, the traditional tripartite distinction between banking, securities and insurance had 
become obsolete and needed to be replaced by a regulatory structure that focuses on the 
objectives of regulation.
346
 In other words, focus had to shift from the legal form of the entity 
being regulated, for instance insurance and banking, to the objectives of regulation, such as 
prudential and consumer protection. The second principle was that each regulatory agency 
should have a clear and unambiguous mandate and should have a specific objective for which it 
can be held accountable.
347
 The third principle espoused in Taylor’s proposal was that the 
regulatory structure needed to mirror the structure of the industry that is being regulated; that for 
example a financial industry in which some firms are too big to fail requires different regulatory 
arrangements to one in which all firms are at the risk of bankruptcy.
348
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Since then, the Twin Peaks approach to financial regulation has been adopted in various forms, 
first in Australia, then the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Spain, France, Canada and the United 
Kingdom.
349
 South Africa is also in the process of implementing the approach.
350
 
4.2.3 The Twin Peaks Model: A Critique 
The potential benefits of the Twin Peaks approach were extolled by Taylor in his proposal. To 
begin with, Taylor argued that the approach would ensure that four issues were dealt with 
simultaneously.
351
 One of these was that the approach would ensure that a wide range of 
financial firms would have to be regarded as systemically important.
352
 The other issue that the 
approach would deal with was that it would avert the risks associated with multiple regulators, 
namely, the opportunity for regulatory arbitrage and potential for turf battles over jurisdiction, 
given the sprawling of, and disparateness in, regulatory agencies.
353
 This would, in turn, reduce 
confusion among consumers, as the same phenomenon that creates the potential for regulatory 
arbitrage also creates the possibility for important issues to “disappear down the gaps”, and ‘… 
among consumers [confusion is created] by an “alphabet soup” of regulatory bodies.’354 Thirdly, 
as per Taylor, in the ever-increasing cases of financial conglomerates, the Twin Peaks approach 
would address a group-wide perspective on financial soundness.
355
 The Twin Peaks approach 
would also ensure that the rare and specialist expertise and limited supervisory resources would 
be pooled and used harmoniously, instead of being utilized in a duplicating and overlapping 
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manner.
356
 With such pooling and harmonization, there would be more ‘economies of scale that 
would result from (the admittedly more limited) regulatory consolidation that it also involved.’357 
 Taylor aptly captured some of these benefits as thus: 
The benefits of Twin Peaks are clear. The proposed structure would eliminate regulatory 
duplication and overlap; it would create regulatory bodies with a clear and precise remit; 
it would establish mechanisms for resolving conflicts between the objectives of financial 
services regulation; and it would encourage a regulatory process which is open, 
transparent and publicly accountable.
358
 
 
There were of course, criticisms against the Twin Peaks model. One of its most pronounced 
criticisms, ironically, lay in what had been heralded as its strength: the definition of clear 
distinctions between the prudential and market conduct regulation as objectives of financial 
regulation.
359
 A positive side-effect of this distinction, it had been argued, would be that 
regulatory agencies would have clearly defined regulatory aims, and this would in turn minimise 
areas of overlap and duplication.
360
 Critics, however, expressed doubt on the possibility of a 
clear distinction between the various objectives of financial regulation, to wit, financial stability 
and consumer protection.
361
 They argue, instead, that these objectives were intertwined and 
aligned, hence they could be pursued simultaneously. In the words of Davies and Green: 
The ultimate argument for financially sound and prudentially well-regulated financial 
institutions is that they are then able to provide financial services and investment 
opportunities to consumer and businesses which those customers may use with 
confidence. A breakdown in consumer protection, whether in banking, investment or 
insurance products, may itself precipitate a wider loss of confidence in types of product 
or firms.  There is therefore no necessary conflict between the two aims of regulation.  In 
the long run they are aligned.
362
 
 
Other than the argument that prudential regulation and market conduct regulation were 
intertwined so that it is impossible to speak of a neat separation between the two, critics have 
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also contended that in practice, both prudential and market conduct regulation would entail the 
assessment and evaluation of very similar facts and issues, that there would be significant 
overlaps between both, thereby negating any institutional set up that is built on an assumed 
separation of the two as different regulatory objectives. Briault points this out aptly: 
[T]here is a considerable overlap – both conceptually and in practice – between 
prudential and conduct of business regulation.  Both have a close and legitimate interest   
in   the   senior   management   of   any financial institution   subject   to   both   of   these   
types of regulation, in particular because of the crucial roles of senior management in 
setting the “compliance culture” of a firm, in ensuring that management responsibilities 
are properly allocated and cover comprehensively the business of the firm, and in 
ensuring that other internal systems and controls are in place.  The detail of some of these 
systems and controls may indeed be specific to either prudential or conduct of business 
considerations, but many of them will be more general.
363
 
 
The thrust of the criticisms is well captured by Taylor, who remarks as follows: 
There seemed little point in having two regulators reaching essentially duplicate 
judgments of broadly similar matters. Since there is substantial overlap between the two 
regulatory objectives and, in practice, prudential and conduct of business regulation will 
focus on the same fundamental issues, they were best administered by a single regulatory 
agency.
364
 
However, these arguments in criticism of the Twin Peaks approach can be, and indeed have 
been, discounted. In the UK itself – the jurisdictional context in which the criticisms against the 
Twin Peaks model were levelled while advancing the case for a single regulator – the experience 
of the GFC, in hindsight, undermined the contentions against the Twin Peaks approach.
365
 There 
now seems to be considerable consensus that the regulatory practices in place during the GFC – 
when the Financial Services Authority was the single regulator – engendered ‘[a] balance 
between conduct of business and prudential regulation which, with the benefit of hindsight, now 
appears biased towards the former.’366  The principled admission here is that when a single 
regulator is charged with the pursuit of the various regulatory objectives, there is the inherent 
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potential that there would be inevitable bias towards one regulatory objective over the other. As 
Taylor observes: 
…the argument that there were synergies between prudential and conduct of business 
regulation overlooked the distinct possibility that one type of regulation would come to 
dominate within a single regulator and that this would likely to be consumer protection 
given the realities of the political process.
367
 
 
It is not just that the extent of synergies between prudential and conduct of business regulation is 
limited; there are also other differences inherent in the very approaches of regulation that each of 
these two objectives of regulation follows. The House of Lords Select Committee on Economic 
Affairs was categorical in noting this: 
There is also a cultural difference between conduct-of-business and prudential 
supervision.  Conduct-of business supervision is often performed by lawyers. Prudential 
supervision is largely an economic activity, particularly at the macro level. It seems likely 
that either a lawyerly or an economic approach would dominate in a supervisory body 
that performed both prudential and conduct of business supervision, and that this 
dominance would reduce the effectiveness of the dominated half of the organisation.
368
 
 
It is not difficult to explain why market conduct regulation would dominate over prudential 
regulation when a single regulator is charged with both regulatory objectives. The reason is that 
market conduct regulation is politically sensitive, and its results are easy to measure, while 
prudential regulation is conducted more privately, has a relatively lower political impact save for 
times of crisis and its results are harder to measure.
369
 It is therefore ‘natural and rational for a 
supervisor with responsibility for both activities to concentrate on the one with the greater 
immediate political sensitivity.’370  
 
Overall, therefore, a case can be made that the Twin Peaks model to financial regulation provides 
the avenue by which there would be adequate and unbiased focus on each of the main objectives 
of financial regulation – prudential and market conduct regulation. As noted in the South African 
Treasury Report on financial sector regulation, ‘the twin peaks approach is regarded as the 
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optimal means of ensuring that transparency, market integrity, and consumer protection receive 
sufficient priority…’ 371  The Report further noted that in light of South Africa’s neglect of 
consumer protection, ‘a dedicated regulator responsible for consumer protection, and not 
automatically presumed to be subservient to prudential concerns, is probably the most 
appropriate way to address this issue.’372 
4.3 The Twin Peaks Model in Practice   
 
This section evaluates the practice that has been employed by jurisdictions that have so far 
adopted the Twin Peaks model of financial regulation. This section considers the context that led 
to the adoption of the Twin Peaks model in Australia, and the manner by which this approach to 
financial regulation has been implemented in Australia and other jurisdictions. The focus of 
analysis will be on the implementation of the prudential and market conduct arms of regulation.  
 
Australia has been selected as a case study for this research for the simple reason that it was the 
first country to implement the Twin Peaks model of financial regulation. The hypothesis is that 
there may be significant lessons to be learnt from Australia as a pioneering jurisdiction, in terms 
of the general experience (the longest for any jurisdiction with a Twin Peaks approach), 
including the challenges that were faced and the adaptations that had to be made in the 
implementation of the Twin Peaks approach. It is befitting to note that prior to the adoption of 
the Twin Peaks model, Australia, like Kenya now, had a regulatory system in which regulation 
was provided by several agencies depending on the legal status of a firm, or as has been said in 
respect of a similar arrangement in South Africa that existed previously, ‘in which banks, 
insurers and capital markets were regarded as separate species.’373 
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4.3.1 The Twin Peaks Approach in Australia 
 
As already noted, Australia was the first country in the world to introduce the Twin Peaks 
approach to financial regulation. This it did in 1998. Of note is that Australia adopted the Twin 
Peaks model prior to the GFC, and that this model of regulation has partly been credited for the 
relative stability that Australia enjoyed during the GFC.
374
 The International Monetary Fund, for 
instance, noted that Australia’s relative success during the GFC was partially due to its ‘well-
developed regulatory and supervisory structure.’375 It is of course true that a country’s economic 
performance during the GFC cannot merely be explained by the financial regulatory structure in 
place – the UK Turner Committee did in fact remark that ‘it is far too simplistic to attribute the 
relative success of some jurisdictions in withstanding the impact of the global financial crisis to 
either regulatory structure or supervisory style.’ 376  At the same time however, the role of 
regulation in mitigating the impact of the GFC on countries’ economies cannot be 
downplayed.
377
 Thus, in the case of Australia, many analysts do agree that the Twin Peaks 
approach to financial regulation afforded certain advantages that the preceding regulatory 
approaches in Australia, or contemporary regulatory approaches in other countries such as the 
UK and the USA, did not offer.
378
 These advantages, it has been contended, were instrumental in 
ensuring that Australia navigated through the GFC with relative success.
379
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The Twin Peaks approach to financial regulation was introduced in Australia upon the 
recommendation of the Financial System Inquiry.
380
 The Inquiry commenced in 1996, following 
the assumption of power by the Liberal National Party coalition.
381
 The Inquiry was chaired by 
Stan Wallis, after whom the Inquiry has become popularly known as the Wallis Inquiry.
382
 The 
main task of the Wallis Inquiry was to assess the consequences of financial deregulation in 
Australia, and to: 
…make recommendations on the nature of regulatory arrangements that will best ensure 
an efficient, responsive, competitive and flexible financial system to underpin stronger 
economic performance, consistent with financial stability, prudence, integrity and 
fairness.
383
 
 
In its final report, the Wallis Inquiry asserted that governments have a sacred role in maintaining 
a healthy economic and social environment in which enterprises and their customers can interact 
with confidence.
384
and recommended a financial regulation system that has come to be 
characterised as the Twin Peaks model of financial regulation. Whether the Australian approach 
to financial regulation is the Twin Peaks approach stricto sensu is a different question altogether, 
which will be considered in the following segments which also evaluate how the various 
regulatory peaks have been implemented in Australia. 
 
4.3.1.1. Prudential Regulation 
 
The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) is the body charged with prudential 
regulation in Australia.
385
 The APRA took over the prudential regulation functions that had 
hitherto been in the domain of the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA), the Australian Financial 
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Institutions Commission (AFIC), and the Insurance and Superannuation Commission (ISC).
386
 
Simply, all prudential regulation functions and powers were converged to a single body, 
regardless of the respective financial sector. This seems to be in line with Taylor’s view that ‘a 
regulatory system which presupposes a clear separation between banking, securities and 
insurance is no longer the best way to regulate a financial system in which these distinctions are 
increasingly irrelevant.’387  
 
Other than achieving cohesion by merging the previously institutionally-oriented prudential 
regulators, the establishment of the APRA had the effect of separating the prudential authority 
from the central bank for efficiency reasons
388
 and emphasizing that there is no implied 
government backing of financial institutions in the event of insolvency and failure.
389
 
 
A unique feature of prudential regulation in Australia is that while the RBA is not part of the 
APRA, it still retains the overall responsibility for the financial system and its function as lender 
of last resort.
390
 The separation between the APRA and RBA was recommended by the Wallis 
Inquiry, which proposed that the prudential regulator ‘should be separate from, but cooperate 
closely with, the Reserve Bank of Australia.’391 A related recommendation was that ‘strong 
mechanisms should be established to ensure appropriate coordination and cooperation between 
the two agencies.’392 The Wallis Inquiry gave a number of reasons for this separation: 
 
First, that the combination of deposit taking, insurance and superannuation regulation is unlikely 
to be carried out efficiently and flexibly by a central bank whose primary operational  
relationships are with banks alone and whose operational skills and culture have long been 
focused on banking; secondly, the separation will clarify that, while the central bank may still 
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provide support to maintain financial stability, there is no implied or automatic guarantee of any 
financial institution or its promises in the event of insolvency, and finally, that the separation will 
enable both the RBA and the [prudential regulator] to focus clearly on their primary objectives 
and will clarify the lines of accountability for the regulatory task.
393
 The essence of the argument 
for separation of the RBA and the APRA has been that when charged with prudential regulation 
as well as bank supervision, the central bank tended to focus primarily on monetary policy, at the 
expense of other regulatory imperatives.
394
 
 
This separation between the APRA and the RBA, in the context of the existence of the AFIC, has 
led to the argument that the Australian approach is actually a ‘three-peak approach’ or a ‘tri-
partite approach’, for the simple reason that the RBA seems to be a third regulatory peak. There 
are, however, other schools of thought on the place of central bank vis-à-vis the prudential 
regulation authority. In some, the prudential regulator is a subsidiary of the central bank, while in 
others, prudential regulator exists within the central bank. This will be analysed in detail in 
section 4.4 below.  
 
4.3.1.2 Market Conduct Regulation 
 
Market conduct regulation, including consumer protection, is carried out by the ASIC, as noted 
above. This regulatory peak is established under the ASIC Act, Section 1(1) of which provides 
that the objects of the Act are ‘to provide for the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC) which will administer such laws of the Commonwealth, a State or a 
Territory as confer functions and powers under those laws on ASIC; and to provide for ASIC’s 
functions, powers and business…’395 Section 1(2) of the ASIC Act enumerates the functions of 
ASIC. These are set out to include, first, that ASIC must strive to maintain, facilitate and 
improve the performance of the financial system and the entities within that system in the 
interests of commercial certainty, reducing business costs, and the efficiency and development of 
the economy; and to promote the confident and informed participation of investors and 
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consumers in the financial system.
396
 Another of its functions is to ensure that information is 
available as soon as practicable for access by the public, and to take whatever action it can take, 
and is necessary, in order to enforce and give effect to the laws of the Commonwealth that confer 
functions and powers on it.
397
 
 
The aim of the ASIC Act therefore, is to institute a statutory body that performs functions that 
are distinct from those undertaken by APRA, in order to ensure that there is a clear separation 
between the prudential and market conduct regulation aspects of financial regulation. However, 
while that may be the case in the letter and spirit of the law, there is the question of whether this 
has actually been true in practice. The Australian Treasury, in its submission to Financial System 
Inquiry (2014), observed as follows: 
 
Market developments and policy changes since the Wallis Inquiry have blurred some of 
the responsibilities between the regulators, particularly between APRA and ASIC. This 
risks confusion about their roles and potentially reduces the benefits to industry and 
consumers of a regulatory architecture based on clear functional lines. It is timely for the 
Financial System Inquiry to address overlaps or gaps between the roles of the regulators 
to ensure a clear demarcation between regulators is maintained.
398
 
 
There is therefore the need for constant appraisal of the regulatory framework in light of market 
dynamics to ensure that regulation is responsive to market developments. 
 
Separate from the potential for regulatory overlaps between what should otherwise be distinct 
regulators, there is also the potential for conflicts in regulatory priorities. In this regard, a 2012 
IMF Report on Australia’s regulatory system noted as follows: 
In practice, ASIC’s approach to the supervision of the entities that fall under its sole 
responsibility is different from APRA’s. APRA’s mandate as the prudential regulator is 
to ensure that under all reasonable circumstances, financial promises made by 
prudentially regulated entities are met within a stable, efficient and competitive financial 
system…By contrast, ASIC's role is understood to be that of a conduct regulator, which 
means that it must ensure compliance with statutory obligations and other regulatory 
standards.
399
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Godwin and Ramsay paint the picture of potential conflict even more clearly:  
As the legal regulator, ASIC should be relatively blind to institutional failure. APRA, on 
the other hand, acts as an economic regulator, the focus of which is on protecting 
customers of prudentially regulated institutions, such as bank depositors and insurance 
policy-holders, from institutional failure.
400
 
 
Overall, it is arguable, from the foregoing discussion, that the Twin Peaks model of regulation 
appears to be working effectively in Australia, the only handicap being what has been pointed 
out above – the potential for the blurring of boundaries between the mandates of the various 
regulators in light of the developments in the market, as well as the potential for conflicts in 
regulatory priorities.
401
 
  
4.4 A Case for the Twin Peaks Approach in Kenya 
The case for the twin peaks approach to financial regulation in Kenya is as much an argument for 
the advantages of the twin peaks approach as it is a portrayal of the weaknesses of the current 
regulatory approach and the other possible alternatives. In making this case, it should be pointed 
out that at present, possible reforms to the financial regulation model in Kenya are being 
attempted through two draft Bills– the draft Financial Services Authority Bill (2016) and the 
Financial Markets Conduct Bill (2018). These two bills, if enacted into law, will, subject to 
certain amendments, in effect install a twin peaks regulatory approach in Kenya. This would be 
the case if the bills are to propose the establishment of a Financial Services Authority for, 
generally, prudential regulation, and a Financial Markets Conduct Authority, for, broadly, 
consumer protection and market conduct regulation. 
The current regulatory architecture in Kenya is replete with shortcomings. What obtains in 
Kenya today is not any different from what existed, for example, in the UK, Australia and South 
Africa, before the adoption, or at least the proposals to adopt in the case of South Africa (and 
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earlier, the UK), of the Twin Peaks approach to financial regulation. The situation in Kenya is in 
fact exacerbated by the fact that there exists a significant proportion of the financial sector that 
would fall under the realm of shadow banking, if the ever-growing mobile phone financial 
services were to be included, as they should be, in the analysis. The shortcomings of the extant 
regulatory framework in Kenya are rehashed below. 
 
The regulatory system is complex, with numerous regulators in the financial services sector – the 
Central Bank (the CB), the Insurance Regulatory Authority (the IRA), the Capital Markets 
Authority (the CMA) and the Sacco Societies Regulatory Authority (the SASRA). Each of these 
bodies is charged with regulation and supervision over specific institutions, based on the nature 
of the institution.
402
 The bodies undertake both prudential and market conduct regulation. The 
foregoing discussions have identified the demerits of such a regulatory approach.  
As Taylor reckoned, the likelihood, and actual incidents, of conflicts of interest, confusion and 
damage would be high in such a regulatory set up.
403
 The phenomenon of the blurring of 
boundaries that occurred in other jurisdictions that have adopted the Twin Peaks approach, such 
as Australia and the UK, is also a reality in the present day Kenyan financial sector. The report 
by Schmulow, that ‘[b]anks [were] combining with insurers and investment banks with 
stockbroking firms…,’ would not be a strange one in Kenya today, where banks now provide 
insurance services and mobile phone companies now provide financial services.
404
 The risk that 
one regulatory objective may be pursued at the expense of another is real in a system where a 
single body is charged with both regulatory objectives in respect of an institution that falls within 
its regulatory jurisdiction. Even if the argument is made that in such cases market 
conduct/consumer regulation is more likely to receive the greater focus because of its 
intrinsically political element, the point is that there is no justification why prudential regulation 
should be relegated to the periphery. In any case, while it is possible to separate between the two 
as regulatory objectives, in the ultimate analysis, a combination of both is actually essential to 
ensuring that the consumer is protected – prudential regulation, in ensuring that institutions are 
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financially stable and do not fail, actually does, arguably, reinforce the consumer protection 
objective of ensuring soundness and fairness in the financial services sector.
405
 
 
The other alternative to the current system that of a unified/single regulator, also has proven 
shortcomings. For instance, ‘[p]rudential and conduct of business...regulation require[s] 
fundamentally different approaches and cultures and there may be doubt about whether a single 
regulator would, in practice, be able to effectively encompass these to the necessary degree.’406 
Further to this, a single/unified regulator might not have a clear focus on the different objectives 
and rationales of regulation and supervision, and might not make the necessary differentiations 
between different types of institution and business.
407
 
 
The Twin Peaks approach will, in view of the foregoing, ensure that there is a clear functional 
separation between the prudential regulation and market conduct/consumer protection regulation. 
This will, in turn, ensure that there are no regulatory overlaps that may result in confusion and 
complexity, but also that no regulatory objective is subordinated to another because each 
regulatory peak will have ‘dedicated objectives and clear mandates to which they are exclusively 
committed.’408 In other words, the regulatory independence that would result from separation 
will ensure that each regulatory objective is afforded the requisite attention. At the same time, 
unregulated and underregulated sectors of financial system, such as mobile phone financial 
services, will also be attended to, especially since this ‘model may be better adapted towards 
keeping pace with the growing complexity of financial markets and the continuing rise of 
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financial conglomerates.’409 The risk of having multiple regulatory cultures and of conflict of 
interest, as it is with a single/unified regulator, is also minimised, if not eliminated.
410
 
 
The possible disadvantages of the twin peaks approach – the potential for regulatory overlap in 
respect of dual regulated agencies since it is ‘inevitable that two separate regulators would have 
two separate rule books and two separate systems’, and the possibility of poor coordination 
between the prudential and market conduct/consumer protection regulatory peaks – are of the 
kind that can be addressed within the system itself. It would therefore be necessary to ensure that 
there are clear demarcations of functions with attention being paid to minimising the risk of 
regulatory overlap, and the configuration of efficient coordination mechanisms, may help avert 
these potential weaknesses. The forms in which these weaknesses, and if at all they actually may 
manifest themselves, are questions not necessarily be determinable a priori, and would, as the 
Australian experience shows, often emerge in the course of the implementation of the regulatory 
approach.  
 
A fundamental issue worth separate consideration is that of the place of the Central Bank of 
Kenya, in this case the CBK, vis-à-vis the prudential regulator, in the twin peaks approach. It has 
been noted above that there are three different ways by which this question may be answered: 
first, the CBK and the prudential regulator may be kept separate, as has been done in Australia. 
The justification for this has already been considered in earlier sections. Second, the prudential 
regulator may be a subsidiary of the CBK, as had been done in the UK prior to 2016.
411
 The 
perceived justifications of this approach would be that since linking the prudential function with 
monetary policy making will result in the best regulatory outcome, because ‘as the central bank 
has responsibility for oversight of the system as a whole, and also the stability of the payments 
system, there are potentially powerful synergies in also being the supervisory agency for the 
                                                          
409Godwin A &Ramsay I ‘Twin Peaks –The Legal and Regulatory Anatomy of Australia’s System of Financial 
Regulation’ (2015) Centre For International Finance And Regulation Research Working Paper Series 4, available at 
http://apo.org.au/system/files/67377/apo-nid67377-99061.pdf(accessed  8 June 2018) 53. 
410Godwin A &Ramsay I ‘Twin Peaks –The Legal and Regulatory Anatomy of Australia’s System of Financial 
Regulation’ (2015) Centre For International Finance And Regulation Research Working Paper Series 4, available at 
http://apo.org.au/system/files/67377/apo-nid67377-99061.pdf(accessed  8 June 2018) 53. 
411
The Banking and Financial Services Act 2016 constituted the Bank of England into the Prudential Regulatory 
Authority.  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
82 
 
institutions that make up the system.’412  Secondly, the risk of regulatory gaps will be lowered 
because the central bank can direct the prudential authority to take action.
413
  
 
The third alternative would be where the central bank performs the prudential regulation 
function. The UK, the Netherlands, Belgium and New Zealand all adhere to this approach.
414
 The 
advantage in this approach is that it is possible to harness skills and knowledge under a single 
body, the central bank. In its 2011 Report, the National Bank of Belgium noted that one of the 
‘reasons why the lawmaker wanted the central bank to combine all the activities concerning 
financial stability and prudential supervision is that the Bank possesses skills and data which are 
particularly useful for the performance of those tasks.’ 415  In the Netherlands, a similar 
justification has been advanced: 
[T]he credit crisis has shown the added value of a combined central bank–prudential 
supervisor: information and expertise on supervision, payments, financial markets, 
macroeconomics and financial stability were all present under one roof.  But even in 
normal circumstances it is useful to harness the full power of this combination.
416
 
 
Arguably, the third alternative, in which the central bank and prudential functions are discharged 
by the same body, would be the best for Kenya under a twin peaks approach. This is because, as 
is the case for other jurisdictions, Kenya would be able to harness the knowledge, skills and 
experience of the central bank in the performance of the prudential function. At the same time, it 
would be possible to minimise costs and personnel requirements, while averting the possibility of 
a complex supervisory structure that may in effect be a ‘three-peaks model’ as is the case in 
Australia. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the history and development of the twin peaks model of financial 
regulation, and its definitive features. The potential strengths and weaknesses of this model of 
financial regulation have also been evaluated. The usefulness of the model in consumer 
protection has been analysed in this regard. The overarching observation has been that the twin 
peaks approach generally provides a mechanism by which the two objectives of prudential 
regulation and market conduct/consumer regulation will be satisfied to the necessary extent, 
without one dominating over the other. In the context of consumer protection, this is without a 
doubt significant, especially when considered in light of the fact that by virtue of the 
Constitution, consumers are entitled to, inter alia, goods and services of reasonable quality, and 
to information necessary for them to gain full benefit from goods and services. The point here is 
that in order to meet the constitutional stipulations, in the financial services sector, there is need 
to adopt a regulatory approach that accords the consumer protection function an optimal place.  
It has been indicated above that having a system by which one regulatory objective dominates 
the other, even if consumer protection is the dominant objective, would not, in the long run, be in 
the interest of consumer protection as prudential regulation by and of itself plays a reinforcing 
role to consumer protection. The chapter has also considered the various alternatives on the 
relationship between the central bank and the prudential authority if the twin peaks model was to 
be adopted in Kenya, and concluded that the best alternative would be where the prudential 
function is performed by the central bank, because that would reduce costs, promote information 
and date sharing while harnessing the knowledge, skills and experience that the central bank has 
already accumulated in the course of its regulatory functions. 
The next chapter draws on the discussion in this, as well as the other chapters of this paper, to 
make conclusions and recommendations that can be used to construct a suitable design for the 
implementation of the twin peaks model of financial regulation in Kenya. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Conclusions 
The previous four chapters of this work have evaluated several aspects of financial regulation 
generally, and financial regulation in Kenya in particular. Chapter One sets out the main research 
problem and the methodology that this research has used to argue a solution to the problem. The 
problem that was identified concerned the appropriateness of the current financial regulation 
framework in Kenya to guarantee consumer protection. The premise is that consumer protection 
is one of the main objectives of financial regulation, together with the other main objective – 
prudential regulation.
417
 
Chapter Two provides a substantive discussion of the various approaches to financial regulation, 
before delving into a discussion of the approach that is currently in place in Kenya. This first part 
of the Chapter, which discusses the various approaches to financial regulation generally, aims to 
define the general context within which this research is taking place. It provides an 
understanding of the various regulatory alternatives that states have, in deciding which approach 
to implement.
418
 The perceived strengths and shortcomings of each of the main approaches to 
financial regulation are discussed, of, course, subsequent to an explanation of their defining 
characteristics. The approaches discussed in this Chapter are the sectoral approach and the 
single/unified regulator approach.
419
  
While the sectoral approach is praised for ensuring specialisation and specific attention to the 
unique regulatory requirements of the different subjects of regulation in the financial sector, it is 
criticised for ignoring the blurring of boundaries – a notion that generally alludes to the fact that 
due to evolutions in the financial market, financial services providers begin to provide products 
that do not necessarily fall into one or the other sector of the financial market, at least for 
                                                          
417
 Norton J ‘Global Financial Sector Reform: The Single Financial Regulator Model based on the UK FSA 
Experience – A Critical Re-evaluation’ (2005) 39 The International Lawyer 33 available at 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Licence (accessed 27 November 2016). 
418
 See, generally, Chapter Two above. 
419
 See, generally, Chapter Two above. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
85 
 
purposes of regulation.
420
 In the same vein, there is a blurring of boundaries when financial 
services entities merge or begin providing financial products for which they were not initially 
registered, for example, when banks begin offering insurance services.
421
  
The other risk that comes with this model of financial regulation is that when new 
sectors/services that fall outside the existing framework of classification are established, they are 
likely to be left unregulated.
422
 An example of this in Kenya would be the mobile phone based 
financial services, as epitomised by the M-Pesa services. That consumers will be left vulnerable 
in such situations is a fact that needs no emphasis. Consumer protection in this model is also 
undermined by the very nature of the model – the many regulators create confusion for 
consumers, and the fact that a regulator is responsible for both prudential and market conduct 
regulation in a specific sector may result in one aspect being dominant over the other.
423
 It may 
be argued that in such cases, consumer protection is the more likely to be dominant, given the 
political sensitivity inherent in this function, and that consequently, if this research is about 
consumer protection, then this approach does not fall short in that regard.
424
 However, the 
argument in this research that such a view would represent a myopic and piecemeal 
understanding of the objectives of financial regulation. While prudential regulation and 
consumer regulation may be viewed as different objectives of regulation, this does not mean that 
they are not intertwined. A failure that is a consequence of poor prudential regulation will 
undeniably impact on the consumer.
425
  
Most of these shortcomings still exist in the unified regulation model. As the regulatory function 
is the mandate of a single actor, the potential for one regulatory objective – consumer protection 
as already indicated above – is likely to be the more dominant one, with the ramifications for 
such already explained above. The efficiency of this approach to regulation has also been put 
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into question, having in mind the fact that the single regulator would still have to create different 
regulatory regimes in view of the differences between the sectors under regulation.
426
 In the 
same vein, having to supervise a range of different institutions may result in the regulator having 
poorly defined objectives.
427
 
The second part of Chapter Two considered the regulatory approach in Kenya. The approach in 
Kenya was identified as being the sectoral approach.
428
 The regulatory agencies in Kenya are 
granted competence on the basis of the sector that they regulate. Thus, there is the Insurance 
Regulatory Authority for insurance, the Central Bank for banking and the Capital Markets 
Authority for securities.
429
 The current system exhibits the general shortcomings associated with 
sectoral regulation. Some of these shortcomings do appear in practice.  
First, since the regulatory divisions are based on certain delimitations along the lines of the 
financial services offered, the consequence has been that emergent areas that do not neatly 
collapse into the existing divisions are left unregulated. Thus, mobile phone-based financial 
services, the epitome of which is Safaricom’s M-Pesa, exist without proper regulation.430 The 
risk that this poses to consumers is pretty obvious. Other shortcomings that have been identified 
in the foregoing parts of this paper include the potential for regulatory overlap, and the conflict 
of interest and confusion for consumers as a result of the ‘alphabet soup’ of regulators.431 
The chapter also discussed current legislative developments, which have taken the form of the 
Financial Services Authority Bill 2016 and the Financial Markets Conduct Regulation Bill 
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2018.
432
 It was pointed out in the discussion that the two bills do not seem to be properly 
harmonised, as they both purport to govern prudential regulation and market conduct regulation 
at the same time.
433
 The enforcement authorities they establish, namely the Financial Services 
Authority and the Financial Markets Conduct Regulation Authority, would therefore have 
overlapping functions.  
It is unclear, as things stand, if the two bills are intended to be complementary or if the latter is 
intended to supplant the initial legislative effort. Whichever the case, both possibilities do not 
portend any amelioration of the existing framework in Kenya. If the two bills were intended to 
be complementary, the handicap, as has been already identified, is that they both create 
enforcement authorities with overlapping functions. The obvious ramification of this is that there 
will be regulatory overlaps, creating confusion and leading to very high compliance and 
administrative costs.  
On the other hand, if the two bills are alternatives, the ramification will be that part of the extant 
regulatory framework, with the weaknesses identified above, will remain. In particular, if the 
Financial Markets Conduct Regulation Bill 2018 is to be taken to have replaced the legislative 
ambition encapsulated in the Financial Services Authority Bill, by virtue of its having come later 
in time, the outcome will be that there shall be a single market conduct regulator working with a 
host of prudential regulators. In other words, there will be a single market conduct regulator, 
working in a context where there are several sectoral regulators.  
On the other hand, if the legislature was to go with the Financial Services Authority Bill, the 
result will be that Kenya would, essentially, have installed a unified regulator model of 
regulation, whose attendant shortcomings have already been demonstrated in the previous 
sections of this work. There is therefore need to review the context and legislative intent of both 
bills, with the aim of installing the twin peaks regulatory model, for which this work has made a 
case. This is suggested in the recommendations below. 
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Chapter Three has assessed the consumer protection framework in Kenya, identifying the 
essentials that the applicable law imposes. The general law on consumer protection, to wit, the 
Constitution, the Consumer Protection Act and the Competition Act is discussed, before the law 
on specific aspects of the financial sector is considered.
434
 The aim of this Chapter is to evaluate 
whether the current regulatory framework, as represented by the specific laws on financial 
regulation, meets the threshold of the essentials imposed by the Constitution and the other 
general laws on consumer protection. The conclusion is that they do not, largely because of the 
shortcomings of the regulatory schemes that they author. 
It is in this regard that a case has been made, in Chapter Four, for a Twin Peaks approach to 
financial regulation. The case for a Twin Peaks approach is made both on the strengths of the 
Twin Peaks model on its own, and against the backdrop of the disadvantages of the current and 
alternative approaches to financial regulation in Kenya. The experience of Australia as the first 
country to implement the Twin Peaks approach is revisited. The choice of Australia as a case 
study is motivated by the reason not merely that Australia was the first country to implement the 
Twin Peaks approach to financial regulation but that as the first country to implement this 
approach, Australia has the longest experience from which useful lessons may be drawn. The 
potential advantages of the Twin Peaks approach are discussed critically.  
It has been argued that the Twin Peaks approach would ensure that a wide range of financial 
firms would have to be regarded as systemically important, and that the approach would avert the 
risks associated with multiple regulators, like the appearance of regulatory arbitrage and 
potential for turf battles over jurisdiction, given the proliferation and disparateness in regulatory 
agencies.
435
 This will reduce confusion among consumers, as the same phenomenon that creates 
the potential for regulatory arbitrage also creates the possibility for important issues to ‘disappear 
down the gaps’, and … among consumers [confusion is created] by an alphabet soup of 
regulatory bodies.’ 436  Furthermore, in view of the ever-increasing cases of financial 
conglomerates, the Twin Peaks approach would address a group-wide perspective on financial 
soundness, and also ensure that the rare and specialist expertise and limited supervisory 
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resources would be pooled and used harmoniously, instead of being utilized in a duplicating and 
overlapping manner, as is the case in the current institutional framework in Kenya.
437
 Pooling 
and harmonization would result in economies of scale due to the regulatory consolidation that is 
involved. 
The Twin Peaks approach has however been subject to some criticism. Critics doubt the 
possibility of a clear distinction between the various objectives of financial regulation, to wit, 
financial stability and consumer protection, arguing that these objectives are intertwined, and that 
in practice, both prudential and market conduct regulation would entail the assessment and 
evaluation of very similar facts and issues, that there would be significant overlaps between both, 
thereby negating any institutional set up that is built on an assumed separation of the two as 
different regulatory objectives.
438
 However, it has been noted that following the GFC, there is 
now seemingly broad consensus that prudential regulation and market conduct regulation require 
different approaches to regulation, hence justifying the separation.
439
 
5.2 Recommendations 
As far as Kenya is concerned, the Twin Peaks approach provides an optimal regulatory model, 
because of its inherent strengths. It provides the most appropriate regulatory framework, in 
comparison to the other alternatives, that will ensure that the consumer protection essentials 
imposed by the applicable law are well implemented. 
The pertinent question that may arise would concern the role of the Central Bank in a Twin 
Peaks regulatory scheme in Kenya. It has been observed that state practice on this issue varies; 
while some countries place the Central Bank under the prudential peak, in others, the prudential 
peak is the responsibility of the Central Bank.
440
 In others still, the Central Bank is a separate 
peak, apart from the prudential and market conduct peaks. It has been argued in this paper that 
the alternative, in which the Central Bank and prudential functions are discharged by the same 
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body, would be the best for Kenya under a Twin Peaks approach.
441
 This is because, as is the 
case for other jurisdictions, Kenya would be able to harness the knowledge, skills and experience 
of the central bank in the performance of the prudential function. It would also be possible to 
minimise costs and personnel requirements, while averting the possibility of a complex 
supervisory structure that may in effect be a ‘three-peak model’ as is the case in Australia. 
 
As has been indicated above, the legislative attempts that have been proposed to remedy the 
deficiencies in Kenya’s financial regulatory engender some confusion as to whether they are 
complementary or alternatives. This is partly because between them, they establish enforcement 
authorities with overlapping functions. If both are enacted into law, there would be a semblance 
of twin peaks regulatory model, which will however be deficient in the sense that the regulators 
will not have clearly defined mandates, as they are likely to encroach in each other’s terrain, 
especially as far as prudential regulation is concerned.  
 
To remedy this situation, it is proposed here that both these legislative initiatives should be 
merged, so that there is a single bill that establishes two regulatory peaks, one for prudential 
regulation and the other for market conduct regulation. Having a single piece of legislation for all 
aspects of financial regulation would avert the risks of establishing two different entities under 
different laws that have the same functions. There will be room to specify and delimitate the 
functions of each enforcement authority even more clearly. The suggestion to merge these bills 
is, arguably, even the more suitable especially considering that both bills are still at the very 
nascent stages of the legislative process. Merging the bills at this early stage, and passing them as 
a single law that installs a twin peaks regulatory approach on the Kenyan financial landscape 
would avert the possibility of enacting different laws that would ultimately cause confusion and 
increase administrative and compliance costs because of the fact that they create bodies with 
overlapping functions. 
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